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Steffan Davies 




This article asks how Goethe and Schiller’s works in Die Horen, in the shadow of the French 
Revolution and the ‘émigré question’, prefigured the concerns of later exile writing. It asks 
how far they established principles of ‘intellectual exile’ that have gained currency in the 
writings of Edward Said and Vilém Flusser. It compares Schiller’s Ästhetische Briefe with 
Adorno’s reception of them; it examines concepts of exile in Goethe’s ‘Erste Epistel’ and 
Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten. Finally, it asks how elegy fits into a poetics of 
exile. The article suggests a fresh perspective on Weimar Classicism, and widened scope for 




   
 
Weimar Classicism and Intellectual Exile: Schiller, Goethe, and Die 
Horen* 
 
Exile literature seems out of place in Weimar Classicism. In retrospect the 1790s, after all, 
mark the point at which German literature found canonical stability, notably in the uniquely 
productive partnership of Schiller and Goethe, sealed in 1794 after previous false starts. 
Goethe, as T. J. Reed points out, ‘was a “behauster Mensch” if anyone ever was’.1 In the 
twentieth century, classical literature appealed to exiles from Nazism because of this fixity: it 
was comfortingly familiar and articulated the culture they had borne with them out of 
                                                     
* Parts of this article were presented at seminars at the universities of Kiel, Sheffield, and St 
Andrews, and at conferences of the Gesellschaft für Exilforschung and the Association for 
German Studies in Great Britain and Ireland. I am very grateful to the audiences on those 
occasions for comments that have shaped the argument, and in particular to Ceri Davies, 
Kevin Hilliard, Robert Vilain, and MLR’s two readers for their engaged reading of the 
complete text. It is also a pleasure to acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme Trust, 
whose award of a Major Research Fellowship, on the topic of ‘A long history of German exile 
literature, 1790-1955’, has enabled the article’s timely completion.  
1 T. J. Reed, ‘Der behauste Mensch: On Being at Home in the Universe. Goethe, Kant, and 
Others’, PEGS, 83 (2014), 137-48 (p. 138); cf. Hans Egon Holthusen, Der unbehauste Mensch: 
Motive und Probleme der modernen Literatur (Munich: Piper, 1951).  
3 
 
   
 
Germany.2 Some saw it as too settled; others, however, claimed the classics for opposition, 
‘wrest[ing] [Goethe] away from the Nazis’ propagandistic exploitation’ 3  and turning the 
canon’s settled status into an unsettling force. Combining identification with Goethe with his 
adoption for resistance, Heinrich Mann claimed that had he been alive in 1936, ‘er teilte mit 
uns allen das Exil’.4 This went significantly beyond the appropriation of authors commonly 
seen as the establishment’s antagonists, such as Heine or Büchner. With overtly subversive 
literature outlawed, Anna Seghers recommended the classics because they looked 
misleadingly safe: ‘Die sechs- und zehnbändigen Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Hebbel, die eure 
Eltern Euch zur Konfirmation schenkten, haben unaufgeschnittene Seiten. Sie enthalten allen 
Stoff, der genügt für siebenhundert Scheiterhaufen’.5 Hermann Kesten, questioning the very 
                                                     
2 See Brita Eckert, ‘Goethe-Rezeption im Exil 1933 bis 1949’, Exilforschung, 18 (2000), 230-
53.  
3 Guy Stern, ‘Goethe as a Figure in Exile Literature’, in Goethe im Exil: Deutsch-
amerikanische Perspektiven, ed. by Gert Sautermeister and Frank Baron (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 
2002), pp. 185-98 (p. 198). 
4 Heinrich Mann, ‘Begrüßung des Ausgebürgerten’, Die neue Weltbühne, 10 December 1936, 
pp. 1564-66 (p. 1565).  
5 Anna Seghers, ‘Illegales legal’, in Aufsätze, Ansprachen, Essays 1927-1953, Gesammelte 




   
 
validity of exile writing as a separate literary category, declared that ‘[d]ie größten deutschen 
Dichter waren Ausländer inmitten ihres Volkes, Exilanten des Geistes’.6  
This article takes Kesten’s ‘Exil[-] des Geistes’ back to the 1790s, tracing it in in contributions 
by Goethe and Schiller to the first year of Schiller’s ill-fated journal, Die Horen. Both men had 
experienced exile, metaphorically at least. Goethe reversed the poles of home and ‘exile’ on 
his return from Italy in 1788, quoting Ovid’s lament for Rome (in Tristia 1.3) on his own last 
night in the city.7 He would later recall that as he worked on Torquato Tasso (1790) in Florence 
on the way back to Germany, he had felt that ‘[w]ie mit Ovid dem Local nach, so konnte ich 
mich mit Tasso dem Schicksale nach vergleichen’ (FA I.15.2 (1993), 1157). In Weimar he now 
considered himself an outsider: ‘Aus Italien dem formreichen war ich in das gestaltlose 
Deutschland zurückgewiesen, heiteren Himmel mit einem düsteren zu vertauschen; […] ich 
vermißte jede Teilnahme, niemand verstand meine Sprache’ (FA I.24 (1987), 414-15). Schiller, 
too, was repeatedly on the move after his unauthorised departure from Stuttgart in 1782; he 
                                                     
6 Hermann Kesten, ‘Fünf Jahre nach unserer Abreise…’, in Der Geist der Unruhe: Literarische 
Streifzüge (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1959), pp. 52-61 (p. 58).  
7 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Friedmar Apel and others, 40 vols 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985-1999), part 1, vol. XV.1 (1993), pp. 596-97. 
Henceforth cited as FA. See also Goethe to Herder, 27 December 1788 (FA II.3 (1991), 452). 
On Goethe and exile: Gert Sautermeister, ‘Heimat und Fremde, Exil und innere Emigration: 
Ein Spannungsverhältnis in der Biographie und im Werk Goethes’, in: Goethe im Exil, ed. by 
Sautermeister and Baron, pp. 19-70; Walter Müller-Seidel, ‘Auswanderungen in Goethes 
dichterischer Welt: Zur Geschichte einer sozialen Frage’, Jahrbuch des Wiener Goethe-
Vereins, 81-83 (1977-1979), 159-83. 
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settled in the Duchy of Weimar in 1789, but only on returning to Württemberg, for a visit from 
August 1793 to May 1794, did he consider that his ‘banishment’ was over.8 The stability of 
Weimar Classicism rested on the itinerancy, both physical and figurative, of its two central 
figures. In turn, Die Horen, launched in 1795, addressed a broader notion of ‘Exil[-] des 
Geistes’. It proposed models of abstraction from the heat of politics – notably, the intense 
concern with the French Revolution and its impact on Germany – that parallel the concepts 
of ‘intellectual exile’ developed a century and a half later in response to the greater terrors of 
the Holocaust and Second World War. Kesten’s claim of an exiled canon was pleading pro 
domo, of course, but in Minima Moralia (1944-1947; first published 1951) Theodor Adorno 
made a more sustained bid, out of the experience of exile, to define the intellectual’s right 
position as one outside society’s mainstream. His most prominent statement of the concept 
cited Nietzsche (‘es gehört selbst zu meinem Glücke, kein Hausbesitzer zu sein!’)9  in the 
background to the dictum that ‘es gehört zur Moral, nicht bei sich selber zu Hause zu sein. […] 
Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im falschen.’10  
                                                     
8 Schiller to Prince Friedrich Christian von Augustenburg, 11 November 1793: Friedrich 
Schiller, Werke: Nationalausgabe, ed. by Julius Petersen and others, 42 vols (Weimar: 
Böhlau, 1943-), vol. XXVI (1992), p. 295. Henceforth cited as NA. 
9 Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, §240: Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische 
Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 2nd edn (Berlin: 
de Gruyter/Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988), vol. III, p. 513. 
10 Theodor Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, 20 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1970-1986), vol. IV (1980), p. 43. Henceforth cited as GS. For further views of 
‘existential’ exile, formulated after World War Two, see Jost Hermand, ‘Schreiben in der 
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Beyond biography, this article is principally concerned with Schiller and Goethe’s ideas. How 
far were they precursors of ‘intellectual exile’ in the twentieth century, seekers of fixity as 
well as its representatives? Following Kesten to search for ‘Exilanten des Geistes’ in classical 
literature has three aims. First, it establishes a firmer connection between exile as 
biographical circumstance and literary theme for Schiller and Goethe – which is well-
documented – and its reflection in their poetics. In so doing, a significant secondary concern 
is to argue for the coherence of their contributions to Die Horen, against the persistent view 
that Goethe’s texts undermined Schiller’s plan. The article reassesses Adorno’s rejection of 
Schiller, and argues that exile is a consistent thread, not just a scene-setter, in Goethe’s 
Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten (1795). Second, it develops a new avenue for 
German exile studies, as the field diversifies beyond its original aims to recover and study a 
forgotten literature under Nazism.11 Exilliteraturforschung has broadened from its traditional 
focus on 1933-1945, towards more recent literature in particular, it has taken on comparative 
approaches, and it has moved beyond strictly defining exile literature by the author’s lived 
situation. Elisabeth Bronfen drew attention to the fluid boundaries between exile as real state 
and literary metaphor – including exile as a metaphor for the act of writing – as early as 
                                                     
Fremde: Gedanken zur deutschen Exilliteratur seit 1789’, in Exil und Innere Emigration. Third 
Wisconsin Workshop, ed. by Reinhold Grimm and Jost Hermand (Frankfurt a.M.: Athenäum, 
1972), pp. 7-30 (pp. 9-10).  
11 See, for example, Literatur und Exil: Neue Perspektiven, ed. by Doerte Bischoff and 
Susanne Komfort-Hein (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013). 
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1993.12 Applying twentieth-century concepts to a different period should enable a distinction 
between their specifically period-bound qualities and those that apply more broadly, and 
suggest whether the differences are ones of quality or degree. By extension, a third aim is to 
sharpen the concept of intellectual exile. Can it be sensibly transferred beyond the 
circumstances of the mid-twentieth century and the specific ingredients of Adorno’s ‘falsches 
Leben’? In other words, did Kesten’s claim have substance beyond its rhetorical effect?  
This article first presents more fully the concept of intellectual exile and the related discussion 
of how exile literature reflects reality (section I). It sets out the context and programme of Die 
Horen (II) and turns to Schiller’s Ästhetische Briefe (III), whose articulation of a position 
outside society as the only position from which art can influence life is pivotal in establishing 
intellectual exile in Weimar Classicism. It investigates Adorno’s attitude towards Schiller’s 
aesthetics, identifying similarities and differences that help to tease apart which aspects of 
twentieth-century exile might be informed by its precursors, and which might not (IV). It then 
asks how Goethe responded to the Ästhetische Briefe, and to exile, in Die Horen, notably in 
the Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten, but also in the tale of shipwreck and 
hospitality in ‘Erste Epistel’ (V). Finally, it asks how far the journal’s examples and discussion 
                                                     
12 Elisabeth Bronfen, ‘Exil in der Literatur: Zwischen Metapher und Realität’, Arcadia, 28 
(1993), 167-83. On the anxiety that the biographical approach which defined Exilforschung 
also fundamentally limited it – an anxiety as old as the field itself – see Bernhard Spies, 
‘Exilliteratur – ein abgeschlossenes Kapitel? Überlegungen zu Stand und Perspektiven der 
literaturwissenschaftlichen Exilforschung’, Exilforschung, 14 (1996), 11-30. 
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of elegy, the foremost genre for grief and lament, might correspond to a poetics of exile (VI 
and conclusion, VII).  
I. 
The notions of exile cited so far already extend the concept beyond a strict definition. They 
range from Ovid’s formal banishment, or flight from severe and certain persecution, via a 
more chosen ‘emigration’ from unpalatable conditions – arguably, Schiller’s absence from 
Württemberg – to a feeling of estrangement within one’s own culture. Terminological usage 
is fluid, too: ‘exiles’ from Nazism, for example, but ‘émigrés’ to Germany from Revolutionary 
France. ‘Émigré’, although historically specific, is itself complex. It implies a voluntary choice 
to leave France, noble status accompanied by arrogant misbehaviour, and counter-
revolutionary political purpose, all of which apply to some of the émigrés, but none to them 
all. Whatever their motives for leaving, by a series of laws from 1791 to 1793 they were 
expropriated and were subject to the death penalty if they returned. Legend apart, they were 
socially diverse: the first émigrés had been noblemen and clerics, but the majority were 
‘ordinary people fleeing from the consequences of civil war’ after 1792, ‘more accurately 
described in recent terms as refugees or displaced persons’. 13  ‘Refugee’ as another 
alternative term implies a migrant compelled to flee with neither choice nor status, seeming 
to have neither an individual face nor voice. Exile, notes Simon Goldhill, ‘means having a story 
                                                     
13 William Doyle, ‘Introduction’, in The French Émigrés in Europe and the Struggle against 
Revolution, 1789-1814, ed. by Kirsty Carpenter and Philip Mansel (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1999), pp. xv-xxii (p. xvi). For a detailed regional study, see Thomas Höpel, Emigranten der 
Französischen Revolution in Preußen 1789-1806 (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2000).  
9 
 
   
 
to tell of one’s own coming into greatness. […] Pity the refugee, but listen to the exile’s 
story…’14 Exile is forced, but it is dignified to a degree by social status, political purpose, or 
intellectual standing.  
Two twentieth-century thinkers in particular have developed a concept of exile that extends 
beyond physical circumstances to a broader cluster of experiences and states of mind: Edward 
Said and Vilém Flusser. It is Said who gave the term ‘intellectual exile’ currency in English, 
using it as the title of one of his BBC Reith Lectures, Representations of the Intellectual, in 
1993. In this and a previous essay he shifts precariously, but deliberately, between reflecting 
on the actual experience of exile and using that experience as a metaphor: ‘The pattern that 
sets the course for the intellectual as outsider is best exemplified by the condition of exile’.15 
He reminds his readers that actual exile is not optional: ‘[a]nyone who is really homeless 
regards the habit of seeing estrangement in everything modern as an affectation, a display of 
modish attitudes’, and he is disdainful of the ‘somewhat pallid notion that non-exiles can 
share in the benefits of exile as a redemptive motif’. Yet he also moves decisively beyond the 
‘really homeless’ when he ‘speak[s] of exile, not as a privilege, but as an alternative to the 
mass institutions that dominate modern life’. He wants to protect the idea of exile as specific 
to those who have experienced it in the past century, but relaxes it with generalised 
formulations (‘Exile is a model for the intellectual who is tempted, and even beset and 
overwhelmed, by the rewards of accommodation, yea-saying, settling in’), or by advancing 
                                                     
14 Simon Goldhill, ‘Whose Antiquity? Whose Modernity? The “Rainbow Bridges” of Exile’, 
Antike und Abendland, 46 (2000), 1-20 (p. 4).  
15 Edward Said, ‘Intellectual Exile: Expatriates and Marginals’, in The Edward Said Reader, ed. 
by Moustafa Bayoumi and Andrew Rubin (London: Granta, 2001), pp. 368-81 (p. 373).  
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Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) and his ‘loneliness as an obscure Neapolitan professor’ as ‘the 
great prototype’ for the position he describes. 16  Referring to Minima Moralia, he cites 
Adorno’s belief ‘that the only home truly available now, though fragile and vulnerable, is in 
writing’.17  
Said’s assertion that ‘[e]xile for the intellectual in this metaphysical sense is restlessness, 
movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others’18 might seem to carry little 
resonance with 1790s Weimar, but he also suggests that the very things that look the most 
settled in fact have shaky origins. Nationalism, ‘an assertion of belonging in and to a place’, is 
intimately connected with exile not just because the nation state created exile in its modern 
form, but because nationalism itself developed in its early stages ‘from a condition of 
estrangement’, from the ‘struggles […] of national groups separated – exiled – from what was 
construed to be their rightful way of life’.19 Exiles themselves seek a form of home in ‘choosing 
to see themselves as part of a triumphant ideology or a restored people’.20 Goldhill similarly 
emphasizes restoration in exile narratives: Odysseus’s return shows that ‘to come back is to 
pay back’.21 On the other hand, the tensions in defining exile, between metaphor and physical 
state and between victimhood and privilege, resurface in Said’s chronology: mass 
                                                     
16 Ibid., pp. 379-80.  
17 Edward Said, ‘Reflections on Exile’, in Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 173-86 (pp. 182-84).  
18 ‘Intellectual Exile’, p. 373.  
19 ‘Reflections on Exile’, p. 176.  
20 Ibid., p. 177.  
21 Goldhill, p. 4. 
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displacement in the twentieth century, he argues, has made this an ‘age of the refugee’ 
beyond comparison with any other, and given exile a scale and impersonality that means it 
‘cannot be made to serve notions of humanism’; it ‘is neither aesthetically nor humanistically 
comprehensible’.22 Seeking Said’s themes in the ‘Goethezeit’ is an attempt to test this claim.  
Said also touches cautiously on positive aspects of exile, both real and metaphorical. ‘Exile is 
one of the saddest fates’, he reminded his BBC listeners, but ‘[i]f you can experience that fate 
not as a deprivation and as something to be bewailed, but as a sort of freedom, a process of 
discovery […]: that is a unique pleasure.’ Exile can foster creativity, enquiry, ‘innovation and 
experiment rather than the authoritatively given status quo’.23  Flusser, who was born in 
Prague in 1920 and fled to Brazil in 1940, built a ‘philosophy of emigration’ on this premise, 
advancing exile as the defining condition not of modernity (as it was for Said), but of humanity 
as a whole. Human beings are naturally restless, Flusser argued, so it is those who are rooted 
who should be pitied; exile has no need of return or restoration here. Being fully human is to 
be uprooted. Equating the two might seem banal, but ‘gemeint ist, daß wir in den 
Vertriebenen und ihrem Entsetzen uns selbst unschwer wiedererkennen: Sie sind so wie wir, 
nur extremer’.24 Flusser connects irony and emigration, with their respective suggestions of 
metaphorical and physical distance. This offers a mechanism to challenge the limitation of 
humanity. ‘Der Mensch ist bedingt,’ he observes, ‘weil seine Bewegung von den natürlichen 
                                                     
22 Said, ‘Reflections on Exile’, p. 174. 
23 Said, ‘Intellectual Exile’, pp. 369, 380, and 381.  
24 Vilém Flusser, ‘Um entsetzt zu sein, muß man vorher sitzen’, in Von der Freiheit des 
Migranten: Einsprüche gegen den Nationalismus (Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 
2007), pp. 35-37 (p. 37). 
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und kulturellen Dingen in seiner Umgebung in spezifische Bahnen gelenkt wird.’25 Schiller, as 
will be seen, diagnosed his age in comparable terms. Flusser proposes that the upwards 
movement out of limitation to a position of irony from which we can observe it is outrage 
(‘Empörung’), and the return to limitation in order to change it is engagement; these two 
moves together constitute freedom. ‘Empörung in die Ironie’ could also be labelled 
‘emigration’ and ‘Engagement’, the return from irony, ‘immigration’. In theory at least, 
Flusser argues, the emigrant is dignified by contrast with the refugee because the emigrant 
moves consciously and intentionally into irony and back, whereas the refugee is driven from 
one state of limitation to the next.26  
At its core, this is a question of how literature reflects reality; of how it responds to reality 
and shapes it. Schiller and Goethe’s engagement with actual and metaphorical exile in Die 
Horen persistently asked the same question; Seghers’s point was that the classics had seemed 
too refined to have much impact, but now, re-read with disregard for canonical respectability, 
they should be world-changing. In exile from Nazism, this became a matter of ethical 
commitment – to ‘keep watch’ over what was left of the truth, Heinrich Mann wrote in 1933 
– such that any form of abstraction in literature could seem an abdication of responsibility.27 
                                                     
25 Vilém Flusser, ‘Für eine Philosophie der Emigration’, in Von der Freiheit des Migranten, pp. 
31-34 (p. 31). 
26 Ibid., pp. 31-33.  
27 Heinrich Mann, ‘Die erniedrigte Intelligenz’, in Essays und Publizistik, ed. by Wolfgang 
Klein and others (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2009-), vol. VI.1 (2009), pp. 99-108 (p. 108). See further 
Helmut Koopmann, ‘Moral und Sittlichkeit als Überlebensstrategien im Exil’, in Innen-Leben: 
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Brecht complained in Los Angeles in April 1942: ‘Hier Lyrik zu schreiben, selbst aktuelle, 
bedeutet: sich in den Elfenbeinturm zurückziehen.’28 Yet commitment to the real posed two 
complex problems. First, the duty that many of the exiles of the 1930s and 40s felt, to oppose 
Nazism from beyond Germany’s borders and to counter the abuse of culture as Nazi 
propaganda, reopened an old question that had also been acute in the ‘Goethezeit’: how far 
can art be a political instrument and yet still be art? Wulf Koepke identifies the ‘radical 
dilemma’ of exile writing as one shared by the Enlightenment: the choice between a pure 
commitment to truth and reason at the risk of being ineffective, and taking sides, at the risk 
that ideology replaced ideals. 29  Thomas Mann’s 1936 coinage, ‘militanter Humanismus’, 
articulated writers’ aspirations to bridge these poles, and Walter A. Berendsohn, similarly, 
insisted that ‘Humanität’ at the end of the eighteenth century had not been merely 
‘Bildungsgut für den Sonntag im Studierzimmer’ but a force in political life: ‘Die deutsche 
Erhebung gegen Napoleon, die Einheits- und Freiheitsbewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts sind 
                                                     
Ansichten aus dem Exil. Ein Berliner Symposium, ed. by Hermann Haarmann (Berlin: Fannei 
& Walz, 1995), pp. 70-90. 
28 Bertolt Brecht, Werke: Große kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe, ed. by 
Werner Hecht and others, 31 vols (Berlin: Aufbau/Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1988-1998), 
vol. XXVII (1995), p. 79. 
29 Wulf Koepke, ‘Aufklärung und Exil: Eine Problemskizze’, in Exile and Enlightenment: 
Studies in German and Comparative Literature in Honor of Guy Stern, ed. by Uwe Faulhaber 
and others (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987), pp. 115-22 (pp. 120-21). 
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ohne sie nicht denkbar.’30 ‘Nutzbarmachung des Geistes’ on the other hand, Kesten argued, 
was the principle that had created modern civilization, but it was a betrayal of ‘Geist’ itself. 
Thus, in an age of instrumentalized art he asked: 
Ist die Kunst zwecklos? Ist die Kunst nützlich? Ohne Zweifel kann sie nützen oder schaden 
und kann Zwecken dienen. […] 
Dennoch ist das, was die Kunst von der Nichtkunst unterscheidet, das Aesthetische, das 
Objekt des ‘interesselosen Wohlgefallens’, die Schönheit, das Mass, die Vollkommenheit, 
das Gleichgewicht, dennoch ist das alles jenseits von Nutzen und Schaden, Absicht und 
Zweck, Politik und Moralität. 
Das politische Element eines Kunstwerks ist akzessorisch, ist ‘zufällig’, ist nicht das, was 
das Kunstwerk ausmacht.31 
The second problem raised by this concern with the real was the place, if any, of fiction and 
fantasy in shaping reality. Where was the balance between mythology as escapism, or worse, 
as endorsement of Nazi ideology, and letting literature work on the imagination by the fullest 
range of its techniques? Often fictions in exile writing have been read as compensating for 
                                                     
30 Thomas Mann, ‘Humaniora und Humanismus’, in Gesammelte Werke in dreizehn Bänden, 
2nd edn (Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer, 1974), vol. X, pp. 339-348 (p. 348); Walter A. 
Berendsohn, ‘Deutsche Humanität’, Die Sammlung, 1, no. 7 (March 1934), 374-79 (p. 376); 
see also Berendsohn, Die humanistische Front: Einführung in die deutsche Emigranten-
Literatur. Erster Teil (Zurich: Europa-Verlag, 1946), esp. pp. 150-52.  
31 Hermann Kesten, ‘Der Preis der Freiheit: Zur Lage der deutschen Literatur’, Die 
Sammlung, 1, no. 5 (January 1934), 238-44 (pp. 238-39).  
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lost reality by ‘creating a new world to rule’ (Said) in history or myth.32 The turn to fantasy 
also expressed doubt as to whether, in the shadow of the Holocaust, the appeals in earlier 
years to humanity and a rational apprehension of the world had not been simply naïve.33 
Kesten, on the other hand, writing in 1934, invoked Lessing to argue that the ‘truth’ of art 
relied on its autonomy; truthfulness could not be anything other than subjective in any case, 
because ‘die objektive Wahrheit, das heisst die absolute Wahrheit der Menschheit noch nicht 
allgemein gültig bekannt gegeben wurde und ihrer bisher nur Fanatiker, Schwindler, Esel, 
Gnadenträger und Parteimitglieder teilhaftig wurden’.34  
This is a concern exacerbated, but not created, in the mid-twentieth century. Schiller’s 
prologue to Wallenstein (1798) similarly held that desperate times called artists not to retreat, 
but to raise their game: under extraordinary circumstances art, too, must ‘fly higher’ or risk 
being shown up as an irrelevance. Schiller famously introduces his audience to a product of 
‘des Dichters Phantasie’. It will raise its viewers’ horizons from ‘des Bürgerlebens engem Kreis’, 
but in rhyming verse, to make them aware of its artificiality; the prologue itself, for those who 
hear it, has the same effect. Schiller’s argument that rhyme is the ‘altes deutsches Recht’ of 
                                                     
32 ‘Reflections on Exile’, p. 181. 
33 Bettina Englmann, Poetik des Exils: Die Modernität der deutschsprachigen Exilliteratur 
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001), pp. 19-41. 
34 Kesten, ‘Der Preis der Freiheit’, p. 240. Kesten at this point conflates Lessing’s famed 
preference, in Eine Duplik (1778), for the search for truth over possession of it and his 
insistence (e.g. in Hamburger Dramaturgie (1769), chapters 2 and 19) that verisimilitude, 
not factual reality, is what is required of art. 
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art states a pedigree for the innovation he is claiming here – the apprehension of reality by 
distance – a poetics which Schiller, like Kesten, feels he must define and defend.35 
II. 
The harmony in Weimar Classicism conceals the extent to which it was born of crisis. Deep 
down, the changes that Reinhart Koselleck identified in the ‘Sattelzeit’ broke the sense of a 
continuous relationship between present and past.36 A new awareness of nationhood made 
Germany’s literature seem inferior to the established cultures of England and France, an 
unease Goethe would address in Die Horen (‘Literarischer Sanscülottismus’, fifth issue, 1795). 
Kant’s philosophy was a seismic ‘revolution’.37 More immediately, the French Revolution was 
ever-present. Events in Paris, Prussia and Austria’s unsuccessful war of 1792-1795 against 
France, and the short-lived Mainz Republic (1793) engaged broad, intense interest. For 
Goethe, the émigrés were a local reminder in Thüringen of what was happening in France.38 
                                                     
35 NA 8 (1949), 3-6; see Martin Wagner, ‘Zeit, Geschichte und Ästhetik im Wallenstein-
Prolog’, Orbis Litterarum, 67 (2012), 366-86. 
36 Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Historia magistra vitae: Über die Auflösung des Topos im Horizont 
neuzeitlich bewegter Geschichte’, in Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher 
Zeiten (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1989), pp. 38-66. 
37 Schiller to Augustenburg, 9 February 1793: NA 26, 184.  
38 Campagne in Frankreich: FA I.16 (1994), 570-71; more generally, see Regina Köthe, Vor 
der Revolution geflohen. Exil im literarischen Diskurs nach 1789 (Wiesbaden: Deutscher 
Universitäts-Verlag, 1997), and Harro Zimmermann, ‘Die Emigranten der Französischen 
Revolution in Literatur und Publizistik um 1800’, Francia, 12 (1984), 305-54.  
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He returned repeatedly to writing about the Revolution, notably in drama and in Herrmann 
und Dorothea (1797), which centres on the arrival of refugees from the left bank of the Rhine. 
Schiller was following current affairs by reading the Moniteur universel, which, given its focus 
on debate in the National Convention, made him hopeful that reform would be moderate, 
not radical.39 War, however, was driving public opinion to fever pitch: ‘Der fatale Krieg!’ he 
remarked to Göschen, ‘Er wird uns Schriftsteller zwingen nichts mehr als Zeitungen zu 
schreiben.’40  
Whilst Schiller followed events in the press, Goethe, ‘embedded’ with the Duke of Weimar’s 
troops on the 1792 campaign, experienced at first hand the Prussians’ retreat after the battle 
of Valmy (20 September), and saw with his own eyes the ‘pity of War’41 – dead soldiers left 
unburied and dying animals left to suffer; hunger and insanitary living; mud and disease – on 
a venture that had unexpectedly failed, and now seemed pointless. 42  Recalling this in 
Campagne in Frankreich (1822), he referred repeatedly to émigrés caught up in (and adding 
to) the chaos of advance and retreat, and recorded the war’s impact on him. Since his journey 
to Italy in 1786-1788 there had been little to compare with the creative impetus he had 
                                                     
39 Schiller to Körner, 26 November 1792: NA 26, 169-70. On Schiller and the Moniteur, see 
further NA 26, 671 and Peter-André Alt, Schiller: Leben – Werk – Zeit, 2 vols (Munich: Beck, 
2000), vol. II, pp. 119-22.  
40 Schiller to Göschen, 15 March 1793: NA 26, 232. 
41 The phrase is Wilfred Owen’s: Collected Poems, ed. by C. Day Lewis (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1966), p. 31. 
42 Nicholas Boyle, Goethe: The Poet and the Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991-), vol. II 
(2000), pp. 116-46, gives a thorough account of Goethe’s experience.  
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received there, but it was the French campaign, the worst of which he claimed to have spared 
his readers, that nearly undid its effects (FA I.16, 515). Asked to read Iphigenie auf Tauris 
(1787) as evening entertainment, he refused; the humaneness of the exiled Iphigenia had 
little place in the Rhineland of the day (FA I.16, 516-17). ‘[D]ie Welt’, he reflected, ‘erschien 
mir blutiger und blutdürstiger als jemals’ (FA I.16, 569), and he was horrified, on his return, 
to see Germans toying with revolutionary ideas (FA I.16, 567).  
Die Horen, conceived when Schiller met the publisher Cotta in Württemberg in May 1794, was 
a microcosm of the tension between art and political reality. Schiller contracted at the same 
time to edit a political newspaper, the Europäische Staaten-Zeitung: these were 
complementary projects, but he extricated himself from the latter, arguing that he was not 
cut out for it, whereas with Die Horen he would be ‘ganz in meinem Fach’.43 This was an 
ambitious project to bring together high-quality historical, philosophical and literary texts, 
and thus both to mediate between those modes of writing and to unite Germany’s disparate 
reading public. It stood out for the intention, stated in the call in June 1794 to potential 
participants, to ban from its pages the single most pressing matter of the day, ‘alles […] was 
sich auf Staatsreligion und politische Verfassung bezieht’ (NA 22 (1958), 103). Schiller’s stance 
seems puzzling. Avoiding the Revolution was part of his programme to unite, and it was a way 
                                                     
43 Schiller to Cotta, 19 May 1794: NA 27 (1958), 3; see also Schiller to Cotta, 14 June 1794: 
NA 27, 14. For a detailed account, see Günter Schulz, Schillers Horen: Politik und Erziehung. 
Analyse einer deutschen Zeitschrift (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1960), pp. 7-14.  
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to avoid censorship,44  but this apparent otherworldliness, Schiller’s misjudgement of the 
reading public and his poor relations with his contributors contributed in large part to the 
journal’s quick demise.45 First published in January 1795, it folded little more than three years 
later. The flaws in Schiller’s ambition to mould the public were exacerbated by the limited 
material at his disposal; in-fighting among the authors, declining quality and readership, and 
financial loss were the reverse side of a venture that is also a programmatic statement of 
Weimar Classicism. As T. J. Reed has pointed out, the frosty reception that Die Horen received 
shows how far that programme was from being accepted in its own time. Schiller and Goethe 
saw themselves as opposition, corresponding about their ‘feud’ with the establishment 
before the journal’s first year was out.46  
The failure of Die Horen makes it too easy to dismiss as ill-conceived. Schiller was addressing 
the most important question put to culture by the age: how could the artist respond as artist 
                                                     
44 Peter Weber, ‘Schillers Horen – ein zeitgerechtes Journal? Aspekte publizistischer 
Strategien im ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert’, in Friedrich Schiller: Angebot und Diskurs, ed. 
by Helmut Brandt (Berlin: Aufbau, 1987), pp. 451-63 (pp. 452-56).  
45 Raymond Heitz, ‘Publizistik, Politik und die Weimarer Klassik: Die Horen im Kreuzfeuer von 
Schillers Zeitgenossen’, in Schiller publiciste – Schiller als Publizist, ed. by Raymond Heitz and 
Roland Krebs (Berne: Lang, 2007), pp. 357-84.  
46 T. J. Reed, ‘Ecclesia militans: Weimarer Klassik als Opposition’, in Unser Commercium: 
Goethes und Schillers Literaturpolitik, ed. by Wilfried Barner, Eberhard Lämmert, and 
Norbert Oellers (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1984), pp. 35-53, esp. pp. 35-40; see Schiller to Goethe, 1 
November 1795 (NA 28 (1969), 93) and Goethe to Schiller, 21 November 1795 (FA II.4 
(1998), 135).  
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– how might art respond as art – to the challenges of the day? What was the point of art, 
when Europe was consumed by war and revolution? These were, themselves, fundamentally 
political questions; pro-republican Johann Friedrich Reichardt took Schiller to task not so 
much for being apolitical as for claiming to be above politics in principle and breaking the rule 
in practice.47 Schiller faced head-on the same existential problem of relevance that authors in 
exile, indeed, many if not all authors engaging with politics, would later face, too. Late in 1792 
he had thought of travelling to Paris to intervene in the trial of Louis XVI at the Convention, 
trusting in the influence on France of a voice from abroad (strengthened, perhaps, by the 
honorary French citizenship he had been awarded a few months before), and believing that 
‘[d]er Schriftsteller, der für die Sache des Königs öffentlich streitet, darf bei dieser Gelegenheit 
schon einige wichtige Wahrheiten mehr sagen, als ein anderer, und hat auch schon etwas 
mehr Credit’. He was soon to be disappointed: by the following February he knew that events 
had overtaken him, the journey was off, and the King was dead. Louis’s execution put an end 
to his optimistic reading of the Moniteur: ‘Ich kann seit 14 Tagen keine französischen 
Zeitungen mehr lesen, so ekeln diese elenden Schindersknechte mich an.’48 Goethe, too, 
recalled the helplessness of Germans who were on campaign fighting for Louis at the very 
time that he was being tried and put to death (FA I.16, 571). Die Horen tested, perhaps to 
                                                     
47 Reichardt reviewed the first volume of Die Horen in his journal Deutschland in 1796: Oscar 
Fambach, Schiller und sein Kreis in der Kritik ihrer Zeit (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), pp. 
225-52. See Jeffrey L. High, Schillers Rebellionskonzept und die Französische Revolution 
(Lampeter: Edwin Mellen, 2004), pp. 122-25, and Heitz, pp. 368-75. 
48 Schiller to Körner, 21 December 1792 and 8 February 1793: NA 26, 172 and 183. See, in 
detail, High, pp. 65-84.  
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destruction, the principle that art must influence political reality, not by direct intervention – 
writing ‘no more than newspapers’ – but rather by cultivating attitudes. The preface to the 
first issue showed Schiller’s full awareness that this was a risky enterprise. Banning the 
immediate present was meant, however, to enforce a search of past and future for traces of 
a humane ideal: an act of mediation, making tangible in the present a humanity that, in life 
as it is lived, is either a nebulous ideal or is all too easily ignored. The journal thus ‘[wird] an 
dem stillen Bau besserer Begriffe, reinerer Grundsätze und edlerer Sitten, von dem zuletzt 
alle wahre Verbesserung des gesellschaftlichen Zustandes abhängt, nach Vermögen 
geschäftig sein’ (NA 22, 106-07). Removing art from a claim to direct relevance was, 
paradoxically, to be its means of speaking to its age.  
III. 
Die Horen opened with Letters One to Nine of Schiller’s Über die ästhetische Erziehung des 
Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen. The rest followed in two further instalments in issues 
Two and Six. Schiller knew that starting with such a dense text would be ‘keine Captatio 
benevolentiae bey dem Publikum’,49 but the text and its outlet were of a piece, as the letters 
elaborated on the questions that the journal’s preface had posed so far. They open 
unapologetically, with the claim that art and beauty are an object of study ‘der mit dem 
beßten Theil unsrer Glückseligkeit in einer unmittelbaren, und mit dem moralischen Adel der 
menschlichen Natur in keiner sehr entfernten Verbindung steht’ (NA 20 (1962), 309). An 
inquiry into beauty, argues Letter Two, is quite the opposite of otherworldly. The tastes of the 
age may be political – ‘der Nutzen ist das große Idol der Zeit, dem alle Kräfte frohnen und alle 
                                                     
49 Schiller to Goethe, 20 October 1794: NA 27, 67. 
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Talente huldigen sollen’ – but its needs are not. Art, Schiller argues boldly, gives the answer 
to the political problems that politics cannot solve alone, ‘weil es die Schönheit ist, durch 
welche man zu der Freyheit wandert’ (NA 20, 311-12).  
In the first versions of the Letters, written to the Danish Prince Friedrich Christian von 
Augustenburg whose award of a three-year stipend had enabled their writing, Schiller had 
made clearer still that aesthetics must be timely, not self-indulgent:  
Ich liebe die Kunst und was mit ihr zusammenhängt über alles, […] [a]ber es kömmt hier 
nicht darauf an, was die Kunst mir ist, sondern wie sie sich gegen den menschlichen Geist 
überhaupt, und insbesondere gegen die Zeit verhält, in der ich mich zu ihrem Sachwalter 
aufwerfe.50  
Frederick Beiser offers one of the clearest analyses of Schiller’s argument: the Letters are ‘an 
essentially political work’, in which art is the way out of the ‘vicious circle’ of a modern 
republicanism that depends on virtue but cannot develop that virtue out of political principles 
alone.51 In France the practical opportunity to found a republic had arisen, but the moral 
capacity to sustain the new foundation was lacking, ‘und der freygebige Augenblick findet ein 
unempfängliches Geschlecht’ (Letter Five: NA 20, 319). Although the Letters’ arguments can 
be traced back before 1789, the reality of events in France was the decisive impetus that 
turned a project to extend the ‘Kallias’ letters on aesthetics, written in early 1793, into a work 
                                                     
50 Schiller to Augustenburg, 13 July 1793: NA 27, 259.  
51 Frederick Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2005), pp. 120 and 123-29.  
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of political philosophy: a speculative project had now become topical.52  Closer to home, 
Schiller’s experience of the Jena student riots in 1792 may also have shaped his portrayal of 
revolution in Letter Five.53 By the time Schiller was rewriting the Letters for Die Horen in late 
1794, after the originals were lost in the fire that destroyed the Christiansborg palace on 26 
February that year, the situation in Paris had stabilized, enabling him to rework his ideas as a 
broader study of humankind.  
Letters Three and Four set out the hypothetical desirability of a state founded on reason, but 
they are realistic about the difficulty of developing the ‘Naturstaat’, which exists, into the 
‘moral state’ which is a mere ideal. The former must keep functioning whilst the latter is being 
formed. Schiller contrasts the statesman with a clockmaker, who can stop the clock’s 
                                                     
52 High, p. 126, argues: ‘Die Ästhetischen Briefe sind nicht Schillers Antwort auf die 
Französische Revolution und sie enthalten keine neue Theorie, […] die Schiller nicht in 
ähnlicher Form schon vor 1789 erläutert hatte.’ High’s general point is that the Revolution 
confirmed rather than created Schiller’s scepticism about rebellion. Beiser, pp. 121-26, 
traces the Letters’ complex genesis and context. Hans-Jürgen Schings, Die Brüder des 
Marquis Posa: Schiller und der Geheimbund der Illuminaten (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1996), pp. 
187-226, shows how the Letters were also influenced by Friedrich Christian’s interest in 
reviving the Illuminati in the Revolution’s wake.  
53 Goethes Weimar und die Französische Revolution: Dokumente der Krisenjahre, ed. by W. 
Daniel Wilson (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), pp. 22-23. As Wilson explains (pp. 28-30), the riots 
had little direct connection with France, but nonetheless emerged from an ‘Allgemeingeist 
des Augenblicks’ which – according to Goethe’s memorandum on the student fraternities – 
contemned any law ‘in das man nicht ganz freiwillig [consentirt] habe’ (FA I.27 (1999), 13). 
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mechanism before setting to work on it. His call is not for reason to cancel out ‘nature’, but 
for mediation between the two; a society imbalanced in favour of reason is no better than 
one in which nature runs untamed. Reason should not replace instinct, but become instinctive. 
In extremes demonstrated respectively by the masses and the ‘civilized classes’, human 
beings are savages if their feelings trump their principles, but worse – ‘eine[-] Depravation 
des Charakters, die desto mehr empört, weil die Kultur selbst ihre Quelle ist’ – they are 
barbarians if principle overrides feeling (NA 20, 318-20). Letters Six to Eight restate the 
paradox with a longer view of an ‘exile’ from antiquity, contrasting divided modernity with 
the lost unity of ancient Greece. In Letter Nine, closing the first instalment of the series in Die 
Horen, Schiller proposes art as the mediating ‘third character’ between sensuousness and 
reason for which he has called in Letter Three. If nobler character is the precondition of 
reforming the state, but the ‘barbaric’ state is no place to develop such a character – the 
circular problem left at the end of Letters Six to Eight – then developing the human capacity 
for feeling is of the essence. Art, Schiller argues, is the best tool for the task (NA 20, 332-33). 
The paradox of this education to republican virtue is that art only fulfils its task because it is 
detached; it can only be instrumental as long as it is not instrumentalized. If this was implicit 
in Letter Three (the ‘third character’ that is neither reason nor nature), then Schiller spells it 
out in Letter Nine: art and science alike are fundamentally immune to arbitrary intervention, 
and it is the artist’s duty to stand back from the whims of the day. Schiller is not advocating 
irrelevance, but discernment: ‘Lebe deinem Jahrhundert,’ he advises the young ‘friend of 
truth and beauty’, ‘aber sey nicht sein Geschöpf; leiste deinen Zeitgenossen, aber was sie 
bedürfen, nicht was sie loben’ (NA 20, 335). The artist’s ‘play’ is more effective than being 
serious: seriousness makes people defensive, but catch them at their leisure, and they will 
listen. Schiller rejects the casual claim that art ennobles, ‘daß das entwickelte Gefühl für 
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Schönheit die Sitten verfeinere’, on the grounds that there are no historical examples of 
widespread high culture hand in hand with good politics, and plenty of examples of the 
opposite (Letter Ten: NA 20, 337-40). In the letters to Augustenburg that preceded the fuller 
version in Die Horen, Schiller had used a line from Ovid’s exile poetry, the Epistulae ex Ponto 
(‘Letters from the Black Sea’), to explore this idea, and its relation to his concept of ‘die 
schmelzende Kraft der Schönheit’ in particular (NA 20, 340): ‘[adde quod ingenuas] didicisse 
fideliter artes | emollit mores nec sinit esse feros’.54 Quoting these lines contains the double 
irony – probably accidental on Schiller’s part – that in Ovid’s context they are simple flattery, 
written to ask Cotys IV, the new, cultured ruler of much of Thrace, for help, and that his 
cultivation did Cotys little good when his uncle Rhescuporis invaded his kingdom and put him 
to death in 19 CE.55 Because this facile notion of art as cultivation has failed, Schiller instead, 
as Beiser argues, ‘reinterpret[s] […] the moral and political relevance of the arts’ to make 
aesthetic autonomy not just compatible with such relevance, but fundamentally necessary to 
it.56  
After the outside position of the artist in Letter Nine, Schiller’s focus shifts onto the outside 
position of art, building up to the vision in Letter Twenty-One that through aesthetic culture 
                                                     
54 Ex Ponto 2.9.47-48; Schiller to Augustenburg, 11 November 1793 (Einschluß): NA 26, 303. 
Ovid, The Poems of Exile: Tristia and the Black Sea Letters, trans. by Peter Green (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), p. 149: ‘Besides, the liberal arts, if faithfully studied, | 
civilize a man’s character, rule cruelty out.’ Schiller also quotes Ovid’s Ars amatoria (3.545) 
at the same point.  
55 Peter Green, explanatory note in Ovid, The Poems of Exile, p. 327. 
56 Beiser, p. 210.  
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‘[dem Menschen] die Freyheit, zu seyn, was er seyn soll, vollkommen zurückgegeben ist’ (NA 
20, 378). This looks like an escape from politics to aesthetics, but it is not intended thus.57 
Dieter Borchmeyer notes that far from depoliticizing art, Schiller derives his concept of 
aesthetic autonomy from the very same concept in politics.58 Freedom is the basic category 
of both: Schiller constructs an aesthetic realm that offers the individual liberty from the 
tyranny of circumstances on the one hand and of principles on the other. Schiller’s model of 
the ‘ganz[er] Mensch’ (Letter Fifteen: NA 20, 359), enabled by such freedom to shape reality 
for the better, is analogous to Flusser’s, which emphasizes movement in and out of 
contingency. He moves through a series of triadic structures in which art, or beauty, mediates 
between mind and matter: ‘Spieltrieb’, which fleetingly brings together the material here and 
now (‘Sinntrieb’) and the timeless (‘Formtrieb’) to offer a glimpse of full humanity (Letters 
Fourteen and Fifteen); the ‘aesthetic condition’ that mediates between reason and nature, 
momentarily setting the two aside (from Letter Eighteen onwards). Such mediation can never 
be permanently established, because there is no stable means to mediate between the senses 
                                                     
57 The most prominent critics of Schiller’s ‘escapism’ are Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit 
und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, 3rd edn (Tübingen: Mohr, 
1972), pp. 78-79, and Georg Lukács, ‘Zur Ästhetik Schillers’, in Beiträge zur Geschichte der 
Ästhetik (Berlin: Aufbau, 1956), pp. 11-96 (e.g. p. 39). For a recent restatement of this 
position: Yvonne Nilges, Schiller und das Recht (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012), p. 211.  
58 Dieter Borchmeyer, ‘Ästhetische und politische Autonomie: Schillers “Ästhetische Briefe” 
im Gegenlicht der französischen Revolution’, in Revolution und Autonomie: Deutsche 
Autonomieästhetik im Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution, ed. by Wolfgang Wittkowski 
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1990), pp. 277-96 (p. 283).  
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and the intellect. Schiller’s individual is determined (‘bestimmt’) by both sensuousness and 
reason, and in order to develop moral autonomy that individual must step back momentarily, 
out of ‘Bestimmung’ to ‘Bestimmbarkeit’, enhancing the power of rational judgement to 
counterbalance physical will. For that moment, in the ‘aesthetic condition’, both sense and 
reason are active at the same time (Letter Twenty: NA 20, 374-75).  
Schiller spells out extensively that the aesthetic, at the same time as being the crux of his 
model, must be qualitatively separate from what it unites. Semblance (‘Schein’) depends on 
separation from reality; where it pretends to be real it is in fact ‘nichts als ein niedriges 
Werkzeug zu materiellen Zwecken, und kann nichts für die Freyheit des Geistes beweisen’ 
(Letter Twenty-Six : NA 20, 402). The ability to perform this separation rests on social privilege, 
but it is not escapist.59 Schiller here reformulates the advice to artists given in Letter Nine: 
beauty does not come about in the hands of ‘troglodytes’, nor either in the hands of ‘nomads’ 
in constant company, but ‘da allein, wo [der Mensch] in eigener Hütte still mit sich selbst und, 
sobald er heraustritt, mit dem ganzen Geschlechte spricht’ (NA 20, 398). ‘Ästhetischer Schein’ 
has its place in the moral world when, and because, it does not pretend to be that world; the 
complaint that reality is being ‘lost’ to aesthetics is in fact the sad reflection of an age that 
cannot imagine art without a definite purpose (NA 20, 402-04). It is the reception of beauty 
that counts: not an escape from the physical world into aesthetics, but the way it enables an 
understanding that humanity is not merely subject to compulsion (Letter Twenty-Three: NA 
20, 386). The ‘aesthetic condition’ teaches the contemplation of human existence from 
outside – Flusser’s ‘irony’, arguably – as a crucial step beyond the physical world: ‘Erst, wenn 
                                                     
59 See T. M. Holmes, ‘Property and Politics in Schiller’s Theory of Aesthetic Education’, 
Oxford German Studies, 11 (1980), 27-39.  
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[der Mensch] in seinem ästhetischen Stande, [die Sinnenwelt] außer sich stellt oder 
betrachtet, sondert sich seine Persönlichkeit von ihr ab, und es erscheint ihm eine Welt, weil 
er aufgehört hat, mit derselben Eins auszumachen’ (Letter Twenty-Five: NA 20, 394). 
Contemplation is the exact opposite of instrumentalization; it is ‘das erste liberale Verhältnis 
des Menschen zu dem Weltall, das ihn umgiebt’. Just as it cannot come from moral imperative, 
it is also free of the impulses of desire, which grasps at its object by reflex (‘unmittelbar’); 
instead it has an ‘ownership’ of its object that is dispassionate and secure (NA 20, 394). If back 
in Letter Six, abstracted thought was given the blame for the present state of mankind, here 
intellectual outsideness produces a solution. Metaphorically speaking, exile overcomes exile.  
The last of Schiller’s triadic structures, the ‘aesthetic state’ of Letter Twenty-Seven, has left 
him the most open to the charge of escapism. He seems to suggest a political state built in 
the aesthetic realm: ‘Hier also in dem Reich des ästhetischen Scheins wird das Ideal der 
Gleichheit erfüllt, welches der Schwärmer so gern auch dem Wesen nach realisiert sehen 
möchte’ (NA 20, 412). Yet he has studiously insisted on the separation of art and politics so 
far, and indeed here too, such a state in real existence, ‘dem Wesen nach’, is a matter for 
dreamers; it is the need for it that exists ‘in jeder feingestimmten Seele’ (NA 20, 412). Schiller’s 
point, to the last, is that this is about a state of mind. This is a community that people join 
because they want to, not out of the compulsions of physical need or moral obligation; in turn, 
they are removed from such compulsions in attitude, but emphatically not in reality. Beiser 
suggests that Schiller himself had ‘something like patriotism’ in mind,60 thus returning the 
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argument full circle to the political sphere where he started, and to the republican virtue that 
the France of the Terror had lacked.  
IV. 
In his exile works Dialektik der Aufklärung (written in 1944, with Max Horkheimer) and 
Minima Moralia Adorno criticized not only the Enlightenment as a whole as containing the 
seeds of its own downfall (GS 3 (1981), 13), but also, specifically, the idealist aesthetics of 
Weimar Classicism as ‘dialectically’ authoritarian. Adorno charged Schiller not with escapism, 
but complicity. Freedom understood as sovereignty over nature, he asserts, is itself 
fundamentally repressive; by ignoring the individual for the sake of the idea, it is as ‘levelling’ 
(‘nivellierend’) as the ‘culture industry’ of the mid-twentieth century. This unwittingly but 
fundamentally, according to Adorno, ‘kettet deutschen Geist und deutsche Barbarei 
aneinander’ (GS 4, 97-98). Adorno’s bitterly unsympathetic attitude to Schiller stemmed from 
a fundamental difference from him: writing in the shadow of Nazism, he was convinced that 
modern humanity so comprehensively lacked freedom that it could not try to assert or 
achieve it. What looks like freedom is in fact an illusion that tricks people into embracing 
unfreedom still further; thus invoking freedom, in Adorno’s paradoxical vision, is complicity 
with power. His pessimism extends to art, which has failed in its most urgent task – to portray 
the enormity of fascism – because that task is impossible: ‘Vollendete Unfreiheit läßt sich 
erkennen, nicht darstellen’ (GS 4, 163).  
Adorno’s counterexample is Schiller’s intention, stated in the preface to Fiesco (year?), ‘die 
kalte, unfruchtbare Staatsaktion […] an das menschliche Herz wieder anzuknüpfen’ or, in an 
unacknowledged allusion to the Wallenstein prologue, to bring a historical figure ‘[a]uch 
eurem Herzen, menschlich näher’ through art (GS 4, 161-62; NA 8, 6). Adorno labels this a 
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move to justify, rather than challenge, the status quo. Similarly, his later essay ‘Ist die Kunst 
heiter?’ (1967) argues against the closing line of the same prologue, ‘Ernst ist das Leben, 
heiter ist die Kunst’, that such ‘carefree’ art and its settled (‘befriedet’) relationship to the 
world around it is unimaginable in an age in which the Holocaust has been possible (GS 11 
(1974), 603). In this situation, and in exile especially, intellectuals have no power, and neither 
should they aspire to it. Power would make them parts of the system rather than its critics: 
‘der Blick auf mögliche Vorteile ist der Todfeind der Bildung menschenwürdiger Beziehungen 
überhaupt’. The only means towards alleviating their situation is to recognize it clearly (GS 4, 
38). For Schiller, by contrast, freedom is fundamental and possible, both as end and means; 
the ‘aesthetic state’ is an ideal, but the political republic is a realistic goal. Klaus Berghahn and 
Henrik Sponsel point out amply that Schiller himself mistrusted idealism where it meant 
contempt for reality: this is the very reason why according to the Ästhetische Briefe, 
conventional means to reform the state are not enough.61 Rather, the decisive difference is 
that in Schiller’s vision, freedom has been derailed in France but it can and must be saved; in 
Adorno’s, the enormity of Auschwitz means that it cannot.  
Adorno’s hostility to Schiller, however, belies the similarity of their thinking and obscures 
Schiller’s position as a precursor of Adorno’s ‘intellectual exile’. The Ästhetische Briefe show 
acute awareness of Enlightenment in crisis. Truth has made little headway in the present, 
                                                     
61 Klaus L. Berghahn, ‘Ansichten eines Idealisten: Ein Nachwort’, in Schiller: Ansichten eines 
Idealisten (Frankfurt a.M.: Athenäum, 1986), pp. 223-28; Henrik Sponsel, ‘Was sagte dieser 
Schiller (damals)? Schillers Antworten auf seine Kritiker nach 1945’, in Who is this Schiller 
Now? Essays on his Reception and Significance, ed. by Jeffrey L. High, Nicholas Martin, and 
Norbert Oellers (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2011), pp. 383-400. 
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Schiller argues, not because it has been beyond reason (‘Verstand’), but for lack of will, which 
is out of reason’s reach: ‘[es liegt] an dem Herzen, das sich [der Wahrheit] verschloß, und an 
dem Triebe, der nicht für sie handelte’ (Letter Eight: NA 20, 331). More deeply, if culture is 
called to rescue modern humanity from the division between sense and reason that were 
united in antiquity, then it was also culture itself that first caused the split (Letter Six: NA 20, 
322). It is out of this crisis that Schiller argues for art’s place and influence outside the 
everyday; for Georg Bollenbeck it is his dismissal of art as simple cultivation within reality that 
makes him a forerunner of modern Kulturkritik.62 Adorno’s image of a culture rationalized and 
broken by the ‘culture industry’, such that it cannot heal itself, is more extreme than Schiller’s 
Letter Six, but it establishes the same logical circle that Schiller seeks to break. His warnings 
in Minima Moralia, that the intellectual must not join in with what is socially acceptable, and 
that art in society is impossible (if it is part of culture, then it is ‘Kunstgewerbe’: GS 4, 242), 
echo Schiller on the position of art and the artist in society in Letters Nine and Ten. Adorno’s 
intellectual keeps cleaner hands, but for him, too, it is only from autonomy that art can 
influence society: as Ruth Sonderegger summarizes, ‘Kritisch relevant werden Kunstwerke 
erst in Prozessen, die sie nicht steuern können’.63  
Although Adorno makes idealism a part of the problem, he also suggests a degree of 
admiration, or even lament, for autonomous art. The ‘Kulturindustrie’ chapter of Dialektik der 
                                                     
62 Georg Bollenbeck, ‘Der konstitutive Funktion der Kulturkritik für Schillers Briefe Über die 
ästhetische Erziehung’, Euphorion, 99 (2005), 213-41 (esp. pp. 216-18).  
63 Ruth Sonderegger, ‘Ästhetische Theorie’, in Adorno-Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Wirkung, 
ed. by Richard Klein, Johann Kreuzer, and Stefan Müller-Doohm (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2011), 
pp. 414-27 (p. 424). 
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Aufklärung briefly considers art that ‘aus dem Idiom herausfällt’, even though in so doing it 
confirms the ‘system’ because it is the exception that proves the rule (GS 3, 150); if the fusion 
of culture and entertainment is a ‘Depravation der Kultur’ (GS 3, 165), then culture on its own 
must be better than ‘depraved’. Similarly, ex negativo, there must have been drama that 
directed its audience less than the total control imposed by present-day cinema, and tragedy 
before the tragic became a threat to stay in line (cf. GS 3, 147, and 175). In Ästhetische Theorie 
(published posthumously in 1970) Adorno sets out the utopian quality of art, a reminder of 
‘das Mögliche gegen das Wirkliche, das jenes verdrängte, etwas wie die imaginäre 
Wiedergutmachung der Katastrophe Weltgeschichte’, although that reminder in turn always 
also conveys the memory of that ‘permanent catastrophe’ which is its opposite: ‘Kunst ist das 
Versprechen des Glücks, das gebrochen wird’.64 In Minima Moralia he contrasts tenderness 
with directness in personal relations, the latter the hallmark of a practical, regimented order, 
but the former expressing ‘das Bewußtsein von der Möglichkeit zweckfreier Beziehungen, das 
noch die Zweckverhafteten tröstlich streift’ (GS 4, 45).  
Utopian ‘Zweckfreiheit’ takes Adorno to a central concept of the Ästhetische Briefe, and 
qualifies his condemnation of ‘Heiterkeit’ and ‘play’ in Schiller’s theory. Significantly, he 
begins ‘Ist die Kunst heiter?’ by pointing out the parallel to the Wallenstein prologue in Ovid’s 
exile poems: ‘[crede mihi, distant mores a carmine nostro: |] uita uerecunda est, Musa iocosa 
mea’ (GS 11, 599; Tristia 2.353-54). Adorno claims that Schiller adapted the second line as an 
authoritative (indeed, authoritarian) statement – ‘Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst’ – 
and ignored its real function, which is to persuade: Ovid is again appealing to be allowed home, 
                                                     
64 GS 7 (1970), 204-05; see Klaus L. Berghahn, ‘Ästhetische Reflexion als Utopie des 
Ästhetischen’, in Schiller: Ansichten eines Idealisten, pp. 125-55 (pp. 126-27).   
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one of many ingenious pleas in the Tristia that his risqué love poetry was meant as no more 
than a harmless game.65  But it is Adorno who misreads Schiller, by only considering the 
Prologue’s last line: he complains that it is a dictum (‘einverleibt dem bürgerlichen Hausschatz, 
bei passendem Anlaß zitierfähig’), but himself ignores its context. Schiller is closing the 
Prologue by pointing out that art creates distance. He is not tricking his audience into thinking 
he has replicated reality in a cheerful drama; the move from grim reality to the ‘play’ of art is 
deliberate and overt, and in any case, the rest of the drama does not sustain it.66 This is 
entirely what Adorno wanted: as in Ästhetische Theorie, he goes on to argue in ‘Ist die Kunst 
heiter?’ that because art delights, it resists and contradicts ‘[das] bloß[e] Dasein’ even though 
that existence cannot be escaped. Art is defined by the tension between being serious and 
carefree: ‘Kunst vibriert zwischen [dem Ernst] und der Heiterkeit als der Realität Entronnenes 
und gleichwohl von ihr Durchdrungenes. Allein solche Spannung macht Kunst aus’ (GS 11, 
                                                     
65 Ovid, The Poems of Exile, p. 33: ‘My morals, believe me, are quite distinct from my verses 
– | a respectable life-style, a flirtatious Muse’. Schiller’s recent editors note that the 
antithesis in his line stands in a long rhetorical tradition (e.g. NA 8N.III (2013), 623), but the 
parallel that Adorno identifies with Ovid is striking. Jennifer Ingleheart, A Commentary on 
Ovid, ‘Tristia’, Book 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 288-89, traces further 
references to a ‘Musa iocosa’ in Ovid, Horace, and Martial, and also points out the irony of 
‘crede mihi’ here: ‘claims in verse that Ovid lives a pure life, closely tied to the assertion that 
Ovid’s verse is not to be trusted’.  
66 See Peter-André Alt, ‘“Arbeit für mehr als ein Jahrhundert”: Schillers Verständnis von 
Ästhetik und Politik in der Periode der Französischen Revolution (1790-1800)’, JDSG, 46 
(2002), 102-33 (pp. 131-32). 
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600-01). In Minima Moralia Adorno had previously made a similar statement on thought: 
when thought loses its independence from reality it also loses the ability to penetrate that 
reality, and yet it must also avoid the trap of isolation, proclaiming ‘die Distanz wie […] ein 
Privileg’, which would consign it to a world in which factual and conceptual truth are never 
brought to meet (GS 4, 142). Although the thought that Adorno advocates appears absolute, 
in essence it is relative; it must transcend contingency in order to understand the factual world. 
Art that seeks only to be carefree is in fact kitsch, the fuel of the ‘culture industry’, but this is 
not Schiller’s art, either: his Letter Twenty-Six expressly dismisses the kind of semblance ‘den 
man […] liebt, weil er Schein ist, und nicht, weil man ihn für etwas besseres hält’ and which is 
‘bloss Betrug’ (NA 20, 399-400). Adorno cannot share in Schiller’s redemptive vision, but his 
conclusion that ‘untruth’ in thought leads, and must lead, back to truth, leaves an open door 
to Schiller’s aesthetics.  
V. 
Goethe is easily cast as an awkward collaborator in the Horen project. The journal missed out 
on the work that would have been a major coup, Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (1795/96), 
because he had just promised it to another publisher; in private Schiller complained that for 
its first issues ‘Göthe und ich fast alles [...] liefern, und leyder Göthe nicht die exquisitesten 
Sachen, und ich nicht die allgemeinverständlichsten’. 67  The Unterhaltungen deutscher 
Ausgewanderten that Goethe did contribute broke explicitly, in the very first issue, with the 
ban on contemporary topics: Schiller replied, when he received the text, with a reminder of 
‘unsere Keuschheit in politischen Urteilen’ and objected that the altercation in it between 
                                                     
67 Schiller to Körner, 29 December 1794: NA 27, 111.  
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Geheimrat von S. and the revolutionary sympathizer, Karl, might offend a sizeable faction of 
the readership by its one-sidedness in the former’s favour.68 Several critics have seen the 
Unterhaltungen as a disapproving reply to the Ästhetische Briefe: Ulrich Gaier, notably, sees 
Goethe’s contributions to the first issue as ‘Störfaktoren’ which signalled that, in response to 
the Letters, ‘er das ästhetische Spiel […] nicht mitzuspielen bereit war’.69 Gaier takes Letters 
1-9 one by one to set out in detail how Goethe’s plot and characters are arguments against 
Schiller’s high ideals. He suggests that Goethe’s criticisms were what discouraged Schiller 
from his plans to publish the Letters, which he had once thought ‘das beßte, was ich in 
meinem Leben gemacht habe’, as a book.70 Bernd Witte points out that the readership of Die 
Horen, who were surely the potential beneficiaries of ‘aesthetic education’, had the very same 
social makeup ‘aus adeligen Damen, Hofleuten, alten Geistlichen und Hauslehrern’ as the 
emigrants whose behaviour is so lacking in Goethe’s text.71  
                                                     
68 Schiller to Goethe, 29 November 1794: NA 27, 94. See also Reichardt’s review: Fambach, 
pp. 226-27.  
69 Ulrich Gaier, ‘Soziale Bildung gegen ästhetische Erziehung: Goethes Rahmen der 
“Unterhaltungen” als satirische Antithese zu Schillers “Ästhetischen Briefen” I-IX’, in 
Poetische Autonomie? Zur Wechselwirkung von Dichtung und Philosophie in der Epoche 
Goethes und Hölderlins, ed. by Helmut Bachmaier and Thomas Reutsch (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 1987), pp. 207-72 (p. 218). 
70 Schiller to Hoven, 21 November 1794: NA 27, 92; Gaier, p. 211.  
71 Bernd Witte, ‘Das Opfer der Schlange: Zur Auseinandersetzung Goethes mit Schiller in den 
“Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten” und im “Märchen”’, in Unser Commercium, 
pp. 461-484 (p. 463); also Gaier, p. 255.  
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Reconstructing Goethe and Schiller’s relationship relies on a record that is dense but 
incomplete, and on letters that are the products of momentary activities and changing 
circumstances.72 Firm disagreement often cannot be cleanly told apart from constructive 
difference; for Die Horen, there is at least an equally good case for seeing Goethe’s role as 
complementary, not contrary. He replied warmly when Schiller first invited him to join the 
editorial committee, looking forward to ‘eine sehr interessante Unterhaltung’ on the journal’s 
selection of material.73 His comments to Schiller over the months that followed suggested 
that he was looking for ways not to contradict him but, quite the opposite, to give his theory 
a practical turn. When Schiller nervously sent him the first part of the Ästhetische Briefe 
(Letters 1-9), hoping that he would find in them a shared goal despite the different ‘tools’ by 
which the two men ‘grasped’ the world, Goethe read them at a single sitting and wrote back 
declaring his pleasure in reading them, ‘da ich das was ich für recht seit langer Zeit erkannte, 
was ich theils lebte, theils zu leben wünschte auf eine so zusammenhängende und edle Weise 
vorgetragen fand’. Two days later he had read them again, looking specifically for their 
practical rather than their theoretical significance, and against expectation he had found 
himself ‘auch da […] nur gestärckt und gefördert’.74 The two men’s correspondence in the 
autumn of 1794, repeatedly discussing the journal in both principle and practice, reveals a 
joint enterprise beyond that of an editor and a contributing author. After a fortnight together 
                                                     
72 Gerrit Brüning, Ungleiche Gleichgesinnte: Die Beziehung zwischen Goethe und Schiller 
1794-1798 (Gottingen: Wallstein, 2015), is a meticulous account focused on critical, 
contextual study of the correspondence; on Die Horen, see pp. 85-109.  
73 Goethe to Schiller, 24 June 1794: FA II.4, 9.  
74 Goethe to Schiller, 26 and 28 October 1794: FA II.4, 41 and 43.  
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in Weimar in September Goethe wrote of Die Horen: ‘besonders sinne ich auf Vehikel und 
Masken, wodurch und unter welchen wir dem Publico manches zuschieben können’. Schiller 
knew fully the value of such devices, pressing Goethe on 28 October for ‘die Geschichte des 
ehrlichen Prokurators aus dem Boccaz’, which then grew into the Unterhaltungen project and 
was placed later in it. He was asking for a free-standing, readable literary text, and explained 
that ‘[w]ie ich schon an sich selbst der Darstellung vor der Untersuchung den Vorzug gebe, so 
bin ich hier um so mehr der Meinung, weil in den 3 ersten Stücken der Horen schon etwas zu 
viel philosophiert werden dürfte, und an poetischen Aufsätzen Mangel ist’. 75  The first 
instalment disappointed this hope as well as seeming partisan: on receiving only the start of 
the frame narrative and none of the embedded tales, Schiller rightly foresaw that the work’s 
fragmented publication would prevent its readers from grasping ‘die nothwendigen 
Beziehungen des Gesagten auf das Ganze’.76 
Apart from the start of the Unterhaltungen, Goethe also furnished the first issue with its 
opening, after Schiller’s preface: a verse ‘Erste Epistel’ (FA I.1, 479-83) that loosely recalls the 
form and purpose of Horace’s Art of Poetry.77 The poem responds to the preface and the 
                                                     
75 Goethe to Schiller, 1 October 1794: FA II.4, 32; Schiller to Goethe, 28 October 1794: NA 
27, 75. As has often been pointed out, the story in question did not come from Boccaccio, 
but from the French collection Cent Nouvelles nouvelles (see FA I.9 (1992), 1521-22).  
76 Schiller to Goethe, 29 November 1794: NA 27, 94; also Schiller to Goethe, 15 May 1795, 
reporting Cotta’s comment that the readers ‘noch nicht absehen können, was damit werden 
soll’: NA 27, 183. 
77 The ‘Episteln’ were probably intended as a regular introduction to Die Horen, but petered 
out after the second issue (see FA I.1 (1987), 1154).  
38 
 
   
 
instalment of the Ästhetische Briefe that Goethe had just read – ‘Edler Freund, du wünschest 
das Wohl des Menschengeschlechtes’ – but it seems at first glance to deflate Schiller’s earnest 
idealism: ‘Ernst und wichtig erscheint mir die Frage, doch trifft sie mich eben | In 
vergnüglicher Stimmung’ (lines 16-17).78 Die Horen thus appears to open with a statement of 
its uselessness: ‘Soll ich sagen wie ich es denke? so scheint mir es bildet | Nur das Leben den 
Mann und wenig bedeuten die Worte’ (ll. 38-39). Books do not change minds, but only 
confirm them, as their recipients only find in them the things they want to read. Horace’s 
reminders to his fledgling poets that they are writing to please, and thus to earn money and 
fame – ‘tu quid ego et populus mecum desideret audi: si plosoris eges aulaea manentis […]’79 
– are echoed in this poem’s advice not to harangue, but to flatter: ‘sprichst du zum Volke, zu 
Fürsten und Königen, allen | Magst du Geschichten erzählen worin als wirklich erscheinet | 
Was sie wünschen und was sie selber zu leben begehrten’ (ll. 45-47). 
                                                     
78 This view is pursued by Thorsten Valk, ‘Ästhetische Bildung als politische Propädeutik? 
Goethes Unterhaltungen als kritische Replik auf Schillers Horen-Ankündigug’, 
Literaturwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch, 48 (2007), 189-214 (pp. 213-14), and by Reiner Wild, 
Goethes klassische Lyrik (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1999), pp. 112-14.  
79 Ars Poetica 153-54. Classical Literary Criticism, ed. by D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 102: ‘Let me tell you what I and the public both 
want, if you’re hoping for an applauding audience that will wait for the curtain’. See also Ars 
Poetica 343-44: ‘omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci, | lectorem delectando 
pariterque monendo’ (Classical Literary Criticism, p. 107: ‘The man who combines pleasure 
with usefulness wins every suffrage, delighting the reader and also giving him advice’).  
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Here Goethe indeed foresaw one of the flaws that would bring down Die Horen, that it would 
fail to convert a broad public to high culture, and like Horace, he focuses on the audience and 
readership which also, by their absence, crucially determine exile writing. Yet the puzzle, on 
this reading, is that Schiller should still have reminded Goethe in December 1794 that he 
wanted a ‘Zweyte Epistel’ for the journal’s next issue.80 Who, or what, is this poem’s real 
target? It not only challenges Schiller’s project, but questions the value of all writing. On its 
own terms, it, too, is just as useless as any other text, and indeed, it is introduced as adding 
just another opinion to an endless chain (ll. 4-7). If read seriously, it reduces all poetry to little 
more than flattery, but it clearly is not serious. Its emphasis on its cheerful disposition (‘dem 
Heitern erscheint die Welt auch heiter’, l. 20; ‘vergnügliche[-] Stimmung’ and ‘warme[s] 
heitere[s] Wetter’, l. 17) pre-empts the end of the Wallenstein prologue, which Goethe 
significantly emended to ‘heiter sei die Kunst’ (FA I.18 (1998), 528). By its very contrast with 
Schiller’s earnest preface, it corresponds to Schiller’s ambition for the journal: ‘Einer heitern 
und leidenschaftfreien Unterhaltung soll sie gewidmet sein, und dem Geist und Herzen des 
Lesers, den der Anblick der Zeitbegebenheiten bald entrüstet, bald niederschlägt, eine 
fröhliche Zerstreuung geben’ (NA 22, 106). As Matthias Mayer points out, the poetic voice 
must not be misread as Goethe’s, and its target is not Schiller any more than its caricature of 
the Iliad and Odyssey as composed for the whims of the market is a straight interpretation of 
Homer. Rather, ‘[h]ier ist eine zynische Maske am Werk, die als Warnung vor harmloser 
Lektüre verstanden werden kann.’81 The real challenge to Schiller would have been a serious 
                                                     
80 Schiller to Goethe, 22 December 1794: NA 27, 109.  
81 Matthias Mayer, ‘Ökonomie und Verschwendung in der klassischen Lyrik Goethes: 
“Episteln” und “Amyntas”’, Goethe-Jahrbuch, 122 (2005), 61-75 (p. 67). 
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declaration of the instrumental value of art; these poems’ ironic self-deprecation does not 
close dialogue about the project’s possibilities and scope, but opens it up.  
Critics who see ‘Erste Epistel’ as contradicting Schiller tend to ignore the fact that it confronts 
the same basic problem as the Ästhetische Briefe – ‘why art?’ – and that Goethe follows 
Schiller’s dismissal, in the early letters he had read, of straightforward ‘art as cultivation’. Little 
attention has been paid to the poem’s second half: the tall tale (‘Märchen’), heard in Venice, 
of a man washed up on the island of Utopia, at the end of the earth. Displacement and 
hospitality in a foreign culture here become the means to extend the discussion of poetry’s 
social value. The story-teller is a rhapsodist (line 59): a reciter and thus also a compiler of 
poetry, and of Homeric epic in particular. He is connected additionally to Odysseus (l. 52) by 
the rags they both wear (in Odysseus’s homecoming in l. 55 and the story-teller’s dress in l. 
59), by the ‘ebenso’ connecting the Odyssey and the ‘Märchen’ (l. 56), and by the imaginary 
story of the man’s treatment in Utopia. He receives free, unlimited board and lodging there; 
in time he forgets his cares, but when he asks to settle his dues, he is beaten for insulting the 
island’s generosity. A judge tells him that he may stay, even though he can do no useful work. 
Indeed, it is a condition of his staying that he does no manual labour, but observes and enjoys 
the island’s life; as long as he does this, his political and social standing will be high. The Venice 
audience are pleased by what they hear. At two levels, this story challenges the account in 
the first half of ‘Erste Epistel’, of poetry called to be functional, but doomed to fail. First, in 
Utopia, ‘Heiterkeit’ has value in itself; aesthetic pleasure is a civic duty. Second, in Venice the 
story-teller influences his audience, taking them by an engaging performance (l. 59) into a 
world beyond their experience and making it attractive: ‘heiter waren die Stirnen | Aller Hörer 
geworden’ (ll. 104-05). Transferred back to the purpose of literature, the message of the tale, 
and of the whole poem, is that poetry is ineffective where it is harnessed to a purpose, but 
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fulfils purpose when it is not; as Mayer puts it, ‘indem [die Dichtung] sich […] zu ihrer von der 
Realität abweichenden Alterität bekennt’.82 It is the outside position of art that makes it work; 
the difference with Schiller is in method, not vision. It is unclear whether the poem’s end, 
where the audience, too, ‘wünschten, des Tages, | Solche Wirte zu finden, ja solche Schläge 
zu dulden’ (ll. 105-06), affirms the story or returns ironically to the cynicism of the poem’s 
first part, but the point is that it does both, its ambiguity summing up the necessary interplay 
of reality and abstraction for which the poem stands. The poem’s topic may seem to be 
Horace’s well-known binary, ‘aut prodesse uolunt aut delectare poetae’, but in fact ‘Erste 
Epistel’, too, finds the resolution that Horace suggests in the following line: ‘aut simul et 
iucunda et idonea dicere uitae’.83  
The displacement of people by the French Revolution was Goethe’s prompt to set out the 
Horen project, and test it, at greater length. He and Schiller had discussed plans for the 
Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten when they met in Jena in early November 1794, 
and he had sent Schiller the first instalment before Schiller wrote his preface. Noticeably, 
Schiller did not state an objection to Goethe’s opening sentence, which is more prominent, 
less ambiguous, and far more ‘unkeusch in politischen Urteilen’ than the character of 
Geheimrat von S. Instead, he borrowed its content and phrasing for his own preface; Goethe’s 
                                                     
82 Mayer, p. 71.  
83 Ars Poetica 332-33. Classical Literary Criticism, p. 106: ‘Poets aim either to do good or to 
give pleasure – or, thirdly, to say things which are both pleasing and serviceable for life.’ 
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emigrants were not just a response to Schiller’s programme, but formed it.84 For Goethe’s 
narrator the French were the lucky beneficiaries of German negligence, and the noble 
emigrants are victims:  
In jenen unglücklichen Tagen, welche für Deutschland, für Europa, ja für die übrige Welt 
die traurigsten Folgen hatten, als das Heer der Franken durch eine übelverwahrte Lücke 
in unser Vaterland einbrach, verließ eine edle Familie ihre Besitzungen in jenen Gegenden 
und entfloh über den Rhein, um den Bedrängnissen zu entgehen, womit alle 
ausgezeichnete Personen bedrohet waren, denen man zum Verbrechen machte, daß sie 
sich ihrer Väter mit Freuden und Ehren erinnerten […]. (FA I.9, 995)85  
Soon enough the family at the story’s centre – Baronesse von C., her children Luise and 
Friedrich and their cousin Karl – proves unable to discuss politics without argument, not least 
as Karl sympathizes with the Revolution’s ideals. It is a particularly impassioned quarrel that 
results in the departure of Geheimrat von S. and makes the family agree that when gathered 
together, for the sake of common courtesy they will ‘gänzlich alle Unterhaltung über das 
Interesse des Tages verbannen’. To fill the gap in conversation the Baroness suggests each in 
                                                     
84 See Jane K. Brown, Goethe’s Cyclical Narratives: Die Unterhaltungen deutscher 
Ausgewanderten and Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1975), pp. 5-6, and Brüning, pp. 103-05.  
85 Cf. Schiller’s first sentence: ‘Zu einer Zeit, wo das nahe Geräusch des Kriegs das Vaterland 
ängstiget, wo der Kampf politischer Meinungen und Interessen diesen Krieg beinahe in 




   
 
the group might talk about geography, history, poetry, and nature, the interests that used to 
be the topics of ‘belehrende und aufmunternde Gespräche’ (FA I.9, 1009), her phrase a close 
allusion to Horace’s ‘aut prodesse…’, but they do not.86 Instead the old priest travelling with 
them tells the first in what becomes a chain of embedded stories, taking on the function of 
the rhapsodist from ‘Erste Epistel’.87  
Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten was written about a year and a half after the 
events it narrates (the conquest of Mainz, from 14 April to 23 July 1793: FA I.9, 1001-02). The 
family’s departure for ‘ein Gut, das an dem rechten Ufer des Rhein’s, in der schönsten Lage, 
ihr zugehörte’ (FA I.9, 999) has been hasty but relatively comfortable; although it is described 
as ‘Flucht’, they are not really so dispossessed of status or property as to count 
unambiguously as refugees. Yet fleeing home is more than just a convenient or contemporary 
device for setting the scene. Their particular circumstances as emigrants bring out the worst 
in them: their conversations become heated and they revert to type (FA I.9, 995 and 998-99). 
Exile has polarized political discussion and made it acute (FA I.9, 1000) at the very same time 
as heightening the need for sensitivity:  
                                                     
86 On Horace and the Baroness: Witte, pp. 464-65.  
87 This connection is noted by Sorina Becheru, ‘Der “ganze” Mensch als “abenteuerliche” 
Erzählung: Anthropologische Dimensionen einer narrativen Evolution kleiner Prosaformen in 
den Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten’, in Kleine anthropologische Prosaformen 
der Goethezeit (1750-1830), ed. by Alexander Košenina and Carsten Zelle (Hanover: 
Wehrhahn, 2011), pp. 271-300 (p. 283). 
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Die Bedürfnisse des Tages, die Hindernisse des Weges, die Unannehmlichkeit der 
Quartiere führten die Gesellschaft gewöhnlich auf ein gegenwärtiges Interesse zurück, 
und die große Anzahl französischer und deutscher Ausgewanderten, die sie überall 
antrafen und deren Betragen und Schicksale sehr verschieden waren, gaben ihnen oft 
zu Betrachtungen Anlaß, wieviel Ursach man habe, in diesen Zeiten alle Tugenden, 
besonders aber die Tugend der Unparteilichkeit und Verträglichkeit zu üben. (FA I.9, 
998)  
Karl’s inability to practise this virtue drives Geheimrat von S. away; indeed, far from injecting 
‘Parteigeist’ into Die Horen, Goethe here shows its ill effects as Karl wishes the guillotine a 
‘rich harvest’ in Germany and insults S. personally to boot (FA I.9, 1004).88 Karl demonstrates, 
in Said’s terms, the exile’s ‘passionate hostility to outsiders, even those who may in fact be in 
the same predicament as you’,89 but just as S. is ‘zum zweitenmal, und zwar durch einen 
Landsmann vertrieben’ (FA I.9, 1004), so Karl, too, carries a double burden: he is exiled at the 
same time as believing dogmatically in the revolution that has driven the family from their 
home. S. is also to blame for raising the heat of their argument when he laughs Karl off as a 
youthful idealist, and his equally unbridled comment on the German Jacobins in Mainz – that 
they will be forsaken by the French, fall into the allies’ hands, ‘und er hoffe sie alle gehangen 
zu sehen’ – Karl understandably takes not just as provocation but as a threat (FA I.9, 1004). 
                                                     
88 Hartmut Reinhardt, ‘Ästhetische Geselligkeit: Goethes literarischer Dialog mit Schiller in 
den Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten’, in Prägnanter Moment: Studien zur 
deutschen Literatur der Aufklärung und Klassik, ed. by Peter-André Alt and others 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002), pp. 311-41 (p. 327).  
89 Said, ‘Reflections on Exile’, p. 178.  
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Exile entails a loss of memory, as S.’s departure means the loss of ‘ein unerschöpfliches Archiv 
von Menschen- und Welt-Kenntnis, von Begebenheiten und Verhältnissen’ (FA I.9, 1005).90  
Goethe wrote the Unterhaltungen in tandem with reading the Ästhetische Briefe. He had read 
Letters 1-9, and responded to them, a month before he sent Schiller the first instalment of 
the Unterhaltungen on 27 November 1794. He can be expected to have read the second 
instalment (Letters 10-16) when it came out in the journal’s second issue in late February 
1795, and although his reading of the sixth issue, containing his Römische Elegien and the last 
instalment of the Letters (17-27), was delayed by his visit to Karlsbad in July and early August, 
he still had time to read the final Letters in Weimar before sending Schiller the ‘Märchen’, the 
last part of the Unterhaltungen, on 26 September.91 Although Schiller was unhappy with the 
start of the Unterhaltungen, Goethe declared himself pleased to be working on the project 
(FA I.9, 1510-11), and it accounts more sympathetically for Goethe’s intention to see the two 
interleaved works as contrasting but complementary. Seeing their relationship otherwise 
means dismissing the evidence of Goethe’s response to the Letters and speculating instead 
                                                     
90 Manfred Koch, ‘Zirkulation und wiederholte Spiegelungen: Kulturelle Gedächtnisbildung 
durch modernen Ideenumlauf in Goethes Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten’, in 
Gedächtnis und Zirkulation: Der Diskurs des Kreislaufs im 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert, ed. 
by Harald Schmidt and Marcus Sandl (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002), pp. 167-
87 (p. 170).  
91 Goethe to Schiller, 18 March 1795 (FA II.4, 63), 27 June 1795 (NA 35 (1964), 229), 29 July 
1795 and 26 September 1795 (FA II.4, 101 and 114). Paul Raabe, Die Horen: Einführung und 
Kommentar (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1959), pp. 37-104, presents 
submission dates for individual contributions, and publication dates for each issue. 
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that his real opinion was the opposite of what he said to Schiller’s face.92 Likewise, looking for 
point-by-point correspondence between the Unterhaltungen and the Letters, as Gaier does, 
sets the comparison up to fail: Goethe, as so often, has an eye for the individual in contrast 
with Schiller’s concern for the universal.93 The ‘gesellige Bildung’ that the emigrants lack (FA 
I.9, 1008) is arguably the aim of ‘ästhetische Erziehung’, for individuals and for civic society, 
but the two concepts are of a very different size and scale. Goethe suggests, in a literary text, 
how aspects of aesthetic education might apply in microcosm.94 In her complaint that the 
children used to talk about sensitive matters tactfully, but now, in exile, they do the opposite 
(FA I.9, 1008-1009), the Baroness parallels Schiller on the ‘fall’ from ancient culture in Letter 
Six. Her scepticism as to whether men can fully control themselves (FA I.9, 1006) pulls 
together on an individual level the threads of Schiller’s conundrum for human society, that 
imposing reason over nature will always fail. The stories as a remedy model what aesthetic 
education might be held to mean, rather than contradicting it. They do not analyse the 
Revolution, but suggest ways out of ‘dem aufreibenden politischen Fieber’.95 They are stories 
not with particular morals, but about the basics of societal living: ‘die Empfindungen, wodurch 
Männer und Frauen verbunden oder entzweiet, glücklich oder unglücklich gemacht, öfters 
aber verwirrt als aufgeklärt werden’ (FA I.9, 1014). They are told to listeners who, once cast 
                                                     
92 Brüning, pp. 87-88. 
93 This, although from a different angle, is also the essence of Witte’s conclusion, pp. 482-84. 
94 See, in particular, Reinhardt, ‘Ästhetische Geselligkeit’. 
95 Gonthier-Louis Fink, ‘Das Märchen: Goethes Auseinandersetzung mit seiner Zeit’, Goethe-
Jahrbuch, 33 (1971), 96-122 (p. 100). 
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out of the familiarity of home, have revealed that they are not the complete individuals they 
previously seemed to be, and whom the situation now requires.96  
From an inauspicious start, the story-telling has a gradual, good effect. The children become 
more receptive to it, and to calm, considerate conversation, re-cultivating the qualities they 
have neglected. As if to answer the Baroness’s complaint about self-control, though in direct 
dialogue not with her but with Luise, ‘der Alte’ is later able to suggest art’s potential to start 
to bridge the gap: ‘Nur diejenige Erzählung verdient moralisch genannt zu werden, die uns 
zeigt, daß der Mensch in sich eine Kraft habe, aus Überzeugung eines Bessern, selbst gegen 
seine Neigung, zu handeln’ (FA I.9, 1057). The stories tentatively restore the memory lost in 
exile, with ‘der Alte’ finally promising ‘ein Märchen, durch das Sie an nichts und alles erinnert 
werden sollen’ (FA I.9, 1081). The reader only sees the fragile beginnings of better relations 
in the family, with nothing to guarantee that another crisis would not bring about another 
lapse. Thorsten Valk sees the storytelling as a failure (and therefore, Goethe as a critic of 
Schiller),97 yet this fragility is precisely what fits the story to the theory. Cultivation through 
story-telling is not a quick fix: the Unterhaltungen also model Schiller’s rejection of straight-
forward ennoblement through art.  
Cousin Karl thinks in polar opposites, in politics and more generally. His insistence on reason 
and reality – as he understands them – is a symptom not just of empiricist purism, but of the 
exile’s preoccupation with the real when former certainties have been lost. When a split 
appears in a desk of theirs at the same time as an identical piece at their aunt’s house, made 
                                                     
96 See Brown, pp. 13-15.  
97 Valk, esp. p. 210.  
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from the same tree, is destroyed by fire, Karl wants a scientific explanation as to why, but 
cannot lay his hands on the one instrument, a hygrometer, that he deems most useful for the 
task. Friedrich suggests that the desk split at the same time as its ‘twin brother’ burned, but 
Karl dismisses that by dismissing all scientific and historiographical explanation as ‘Spaß’ and 
trickery; ‘eine einzelne Handlung oder Begebenheit ist interessant, nicht weil sie erklärbar 
oder wahrscheinlich, sondern weil sie wahr ist’ (FA I.9, 1030-32). His literary taste is the same, 
as he asks at the end of the frame narrative for a wholly fictitious story, ‘irgend ein Märchen’, 
because ‘verbunden mit der Wahrheit bringt [die Einbildungskraft] meist nur Ungeheuer 
hervor und scheint mir alsdann gewöhnlich mit dem Verstand und der Vernunft im 
Widerspruche zu stehen’ (FA I.9, 1081).  
Karl’s ‘seduction’ by the Revolution (FA I.9, 997) and the fact that he cannot deal with the 
inexact sets him among the ‘Fanatiker, Schwindler, Esel’ whom Kesten described as seeking 
absolute truth. Yet he asks the question that follows on reasonably from Schiller’s Letters and 
Goethe’s story-telling alike, and is surely in the reader’s mind too: how firmly must a story be 
based in factual reality in order to inform the ‘real world’? Both works set a space aside for 
‘unreal’ discussion, but with political reality ever-present. Goethe’s exiles are only forbidden 
from discussing current affairs when gathered as a family group (FA I.9, 1007); outside events 
punctuate the stories and, in the case of the broken desk, uncannily fit into them. The 
question runs through the discussions in Goethe’s frame: the opposite of Karl’s attitude is 
that spoken by ‘der Alte’, who observes that people are most interested in novelty and gossip 
because those are ‘facts’ that fire the imagination but distract the mind from anything more 
profound (FA I.9, 1012). His advice to the cousins on dealing with the confusing mass of news 
and rumours they are hearing is ‘daß wir dasjenige glauben, was uns angenehm ist, ohne 
Umstände das verwerfen, was uns unangenhm wäre, und daß wir übrigens wahr sein lassen, 
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was wahr sein kann’ (FA I.9, 1017). The characters eventually view the stories in a similar light, 
broadly agreeing that their reality, like their morality, is a matter not of their contents but of 
their effect. In this light, Karl’s request for a ‘Märchen’ in fact shows considerable progress. 
He speaks out for autonomous imagination, which ‘muß uns keinen Gegenstand aufdringen 
wollen, sie soll, wenn sie Kunstwerke hervorbringt, nur wie eine Musik auf uns selbst spielen, 
uns in uns selbst bewegen und zwar so daß wir vergessen, daß etwas außer uns sei, das diese 
Bewegung hervorbringt’ (FA I.9, 1081). By learning to respond to art rather than to seek its 
meaning, he is acting on the warning that ‘der Alte’ gave at the start: ‘man soll keine meiner 
Geschichten deuten!’ (FA I.9, 1016). Even so, it is not on this note that the frame narrative 
ends, but with the cousins gladly parting from ‘der Alte’ in order to hear more about 
Friedrich’s visit to their aunt. His ‘Neuigkeiten und Nachrichten von dem was indessen 
geschehen war’ (FA I.9, 1081) eclipse the stories with ease.   
Where is exile in the ‘Märchen’? First, the story extends the investigation of the real: it is the 
first in the cycle for which no connection at all is claimed with outside reality, and yet ‘der 
Alte’ promises it will be a reminder of ‘nichts und alles’. Goethe, similarly, wrote to Wilhelm 
von Humboldt, ‘[e]s war […] eine schwere Aufgabe, zugleich bedeutend und deutungslos zu 
sein’.98 Fantasy creates a more complete reality than appeal to fact. There is no return to the 
frame narrative at the end – Goethe had signalled that he would be happy ‘wenn [die 
Unterhaltungen] durch ein Produkt der Einbildungskraft gleichsam ins Unendliche ausliefen’99 
– and in thus defying interpretation, the story reflects Schiller’s idea of art that speaks to the 
world by not being a direct extension of it. Humboldt praised Goethe for presenting the 
                                                     
98 Goethe to Wilhelm von Humboldt, 27 May 1796: FA II.4, 188.  
99 Goethe to Schiller, 17 August 1795: FA II.4, 106. 
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products of pure imagination as real (rather than investing the products of reality with 
imagination) and thus writing in a genre that expressed, uniquely, ‘das eigentliche Wesen des 
bloß Poetischen’.100 Second, the story’s characters are not exiles or refugees, but nearly all 
are in some way uprooted or incomplete, arguably – to quote Flusser – ‘Heimatlose’ who 
become ‘das wache Bewußtsein aller Beheimateten und […] Vorbote[n] der Zukunft’, because 
through their uprootedness they form a community that exemplifies ‘das Geheimnis des 
Mitseins mit anderen’.101 The will-o’-the-wisps that appear at the start are outsiders who 
have come in search of the beautiful Lilie and disrupt established life. Their gold is dangerous 
for the ferryman and they cannot pay him in vegetables as he requires; they then appear to 
the old woman as ‘zwei ungestüme Wanderer’, strip her home of its gold decoration and turn 
her dog into onyx; her hand shrivels up when she fails to pay their debt to the ferryman. At 
the same time, they are essentially creative, as the gold coins they produce enable the snake 
to light up and, in turn, to illuminate the four kings hidden in a rock chasm, jointly with the 
old man with the lamp, who has never yet lit the chasm ‘[weil] ich das Dunkle nicht erleuchten 
darf’ (FA I.9, 1088). On her quest to find Lilie to revive her dog, the old woman meets a youth 
who is also seeking Lilie but only later reveals that he has been made miserable by his love 
for her. In turn Lilie mourns the loss of her canary, killed by the youth’s hawk. Although there 
                                                     
100 Wilhelm von Humboldt to Goethe, 9 February 1796: FA I.9, 1529-30.  
101 ‘Wohnung beziehen in der Heimatlosigkeit’, in Von der Freiheit des Migranten, pp. 15-30 
(p. 30). Leonie Marx sees the ‘Gemeinschaftsbegriff’ of the ‘Märchen’ received, via Gustav 
Landauer’s Der werdende Mensch (1921), in Ernst Toller’s exile drama Pastor Hall (1939): 
Leonie Marx, ‘Ernst Toller und Goethe’, in Goethe im Exil, ed. by Sautermeister and Baron, 
pp. 71-84 (pp. 82-84).  
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are loosely defined places in the story – the river, the rocks, the bridge formed by the snake, 
the temple that emerges from the ground – it is the way in which the characters complement 
each other that rescues their society and revives it. Lilie, ‘die vollkommene Schönheit’ (FA I.9, 
1095), revives the dog; the youth, on touching her, falls ‘entseelt aus ihren Armen zur Erde’ 
(FA I.9, 1101) but is half-revived by the old man with the lamp (who also revives the canary) 
and comes fully back to life through his coronation by three of the four kings in the rock. 
Power, light, and beauty combine to restore order, a combination echoed by the symbols with 
which the three kings invest him: a sword, a sceptre, and a crown of oak-leaves. As the new 
king, brought back to life, kisses Lilie, the old man remarks that love, as a fourth power, 
‘herrscht nicht, aber sie bildet und das ist mehr’ (FA I.9, 1111). Society is redeemed by beauty 
and by the ‘Heiterkeit’ (FA I.9, 1100) that has been present, but also disruptive and under 
challenge, from the start.102 The giant, whose shadow initially offers one of the few means to 
cross the river, nearly destroys the new society by his clumsiness, but ends up regulating it, 
as the vast stone statue into which he is transformed works as a sundial in the castle forecourt 
(FA I.9, 1086 and 1112-13). Spatial isolation at the beginning of the tale – the challenge of 
crossing the river to reach Lilie – has turned to centrality by the final sentence: ‘bis auf den 
heutigen Tag wimmelt die Brücke von Wanderern, und der Tempel ist der besuchteste auf 
der ganzen Erde’ (FA I.9, 1114). The last story told to Goethe’s exiles ends with a population 
that has become thoroughly ‘behaust’.  
                                                     
102 Witte, p. 478, reads the coronation as meaning ‘daß die Kunst in der Gegenwart die 
Funktionen zu erfüllen hat, die in der jüngsten Vergangenheit der politischen Macht, im 
Mittelalter der Kirche und in der Antike der Philosophie zugekommen waren.’ 
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VI. 
Finally, Die Horen in its first year presented and tested a genre that, at first sight, is germane 
to exile writing: elegy. Elegy has two distinct definitions, as the distich metrical form is 
separate from the sorrow and lament of the elegiac mode. It marks another point at which 
exile as a metaphor correlates strikingly, but not in full, with the actual phenomenon that is 
its vehicle; at which intellectual exile seen across a longer historical span is like the narrower, 
twentieth-century phenomenon from which the term arose, but not nearly as distressing. The 
first year of Die Horen reflected the range of moods that elegiac form can cover: Goethe’s 
Römische Elegien, in the tradition of Latin love elegy, in the sixth issue, Schiller’s ‘Elegie’ (later 
reworked and renamed ‘Der Spaziergang’) in the tenth, and the first two instalments of 
Schiller’s three-part essay Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, including his discussion 
of this genre, in issues Eleven and Twelve.  
The Roman Elegies, published under the title ‘Elegien’, are elegies in form and not at all in 
mode, a celebration of the fullness of life – cultural, erotic, creative – that Goethe had found 
in Rome. They were written well before their publication, possibly already started in Rome 
and certainly catalyzed when Knebel sent Goethe a ‘Kleeblatt der Dichter’ – the love poems 
of the ‘triumvirate’ of Elegy Five, Catullus, Tibullus, and Propertius – in Weimar in October 
1788.103 Yet there are two reasons to consider them through the lens of exile writing, neither 
of which calls into question their fundamentally affirmative tone; indeed, they contribute to 
                                                     
103 W. Daniel Wilson, Goethes Erotica und die Weimarer ‘Zensoren’ (Hanover: Wehrhahn, 
2015), p. 26; FA I.1, 1088. The Elegies are quoted and numbered here according to the text 
in Die Horen, FA I.1, 393-439 (odd pages).  
53 
 
   
 
it. First, the Roman Elegies rely on inverting ‘home’ and ‘abroad’, playing with the idea of 
banishment as the key to rich experience. This is partly biographical: the opening lines of Elegy 
Seven, ‘O wie fühl ich in Rom mich so froh! Gedenk ich der Zeiten, | Da mich ein graulicher 
Tag hinten im Norden umfing’, were probably not true of their author as he wrote, and they 
certainly did not reflect the situation of their audience. The prudish reception of the Elegies, 
as of Goethe’s relationship with Christiane Vulpius, confirmed the image of a ‘grey’ Weimar; 
Rome, on the other hand, had been the exciting city of light, colour, and form. If Goethe felt 
himself ‘exiled’ in Germany because he had been freer in Rome, then he shared the feeling 
with Winckelmann, whose Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums (1764) had guided him around 
the city. In 1768 Winckelmann had written from Vienna, as he curtailed his return visit to the 
Germany he had left in 1755, ‘daß für mich außer Rom kein wahres Vergnügen zu hoffen ist, 
da ich es mit tausend Beschwerlichkeiten erkaufen muß’. 104  Goethe’s ‘sketches’ of 
Winckelmann in 1805 portrayed a figure who at his best was ‘ganz und abgeschlossen’ (FA 
I.19 (1998), 180) – thus overcoming humanity’s ‘exile’ from antiquity – and yet was awkward 
in company, needy of appreciation for his work, and restless, even in Rome. Describing 
Winckelmann’s abortive return, Goethe drew the same parallel with the Cimmerians, who 
                                                     
104 Winckelmann to Wilhelm von Stosch, 14 May 1768: Johann Joachim Winckelmann, 
Briefe, ed. by Walther Rehm, 4 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1952-1957), vol. III (1956), p. 389; 
Goethe, Italienische Reise, FA I.15.1, 157 and 159, and conversation reported by Sulpiz 
Boisserée, 3 August 1815: FA II.7 (1994), 481-82. 
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live near the underworld in perpetual mist and cloud in Odyssey 11.14-19, as he later did in 
Zweiter Römischer Aufenthalt (1829) to recall the Weimar he had left in 1786.105 
Independently of Goethe’s life, the poetry of the Elegies depends on this same inversion. 
Elegy Seven develops its theme at the Capitoline Hill, the site of several temples including 
Rome’s most important, the Temple of Jupiter, where the ‘I’ dreams of visiting the gods on 
Olympus. He could hardly be more at home (‘Welche Seligkeit ward mir Sterblichen!’, l. 11), 
and yet he knows he should not be there and is a tolerated guest at best; his imagined 
banishment from Olympus to the underworld at the end also takes in his status as an actual 
guest in Rome, as he passes the city’s burial-ground for non-Catholics, located at the Pyramid 
of Cestius, on the way. Elegy One has already captured the shock of arriving in Rome with 
hopes that are not immediately fulfilled: a tourist who knows in his mind what he ought to be 
feeling, ‘nur mir schweiget alles so still’. In Elegy Thirteen, the poet’s abstracted study of 
antiquity – ‘Du betrachtest mit Staunen die Trümmern alter Gebäude’ – cues Amor’s reminder 
that the basis of creativity is in the present: ‘Die Antike war neu da jene Glückliche lebten, | 
Lebe glücklich und so lebe die Vorzeit in dir’.  
Second, then, the Roman Elegies are poems that know their abstraction from Rome, both 
geographically and in the gap between antiquity and the modern world. They do not 
downplay distance, but celebrate the means by which it is overcome. Encountering the ‘silent’ 
ancient city in Elegy One enables erotic encounter to bring it to life; the imagination takes 
centre stage in Elegy Seven. Memory is ever-present, whether personal (the barking dog in 
                                                     
105 FA I.19, 211 and FA I.15.1, 460; see Goethe-Wörterbuch (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1978-), 
vol. V (2011), col. 368, s.v. ‘kimmerisch’. 
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Elegy Seventeen) or cultural: the history and mythology evoked in Elegies Three and Ten, and, 
taking the cycle as a whole, the conventions of Latin love elegy to which the Elegies allude 
(see FA I.1, 1091-92). The poems focus not solely on natural experience, but on the second-
level methods that are the only means of expressing it.106 Their metre makes their artificiality 
stand out, like the rhymed verse of Wallenstein. As has been widely pointed out, these are 
poems that reflect expressly on the fact and process of being written, most conspicuously in 
the final elegy of the published cycle, in which the poet entrusts to his poetry the secret of his 
joy, but present as early as the obvious play with language – Roma/Amor – in Elegy One. 
Consciousness of time articulates timelessness: total fulfilment is evoked when marked time 
is absent, as in Elegy Nine, ‘devoted to the single moment of “uprushing flame” […] which 
never ceases through the whole course of the poem’, but the measure of this fulfilment is the 
presence of temporality when, as in the large majority of the Elegies, the actual moment of 
love-making is outside the poem’s scope.107 These are poems about thinking and reflection – 
the note to which the Ninth Elegy turns at its end, as it switches from the present tense to the 
past – as much as they are about experience.108 Distance is the way to articulate immediacy 
and to experience it again.  
The Roman Elegies are elegies in the metrical sense; Schiller’s discussion of the genre in Über 
naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, on the other hand, was about the elegiac mode. This 
could be expected to come closer to the experience of exile, a ‘condition of terminal loss’ 
                                                     
106 See in particular Wild, pp. 52-57.   
107 Boyle, vol. I (1991), p. 635. The translation is David Luke’s: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 
Roman Elegies and The Diary (London: Libris, 1988), p. 59.  
108 Boyle, vol. I, pp. 635-37.  
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(Said) for which elegy would be a natural form of expression.109 Rüdiger Görner suggests that 
in the twentieth century, indeed, the genre in German came into its own: ‘Elegische Lyrik ist 
reflektierter Natur. Sie entsteht aus melancholischer Selbstbesinnung. Das 20. Jahrhundert 
hat dazu Anlässe in bestürzendem Ausmaß geboten, zumal aus deutscher Sicht.’ 110  For 
Schiller, elegy is a genre of sentimental poetry: it is detached from its object and cannot be of 
a piece with what it describes, but instead it reflects on it, and on the discrepancy between 
the real and the ideal. It concentrates on a lost state of natural being and on unattainable 
ideals, seeing them as ‘ein Gegenstand der Trauer’ (NA 20, 448). Schiller’s definition of elegy 
touches not only the grief of exile, but a tendency identified in mid-twentieth-century exile 
poetry to avoid the here and now, by either looking to a utopian future or regressing to the 
familiar in a ‘Wunschverlangen nach dem schönen Gestern’.111 Loneliness and reflection on 
the self are further tendencies shared by exile poetry and the elegy alike. As Theodore 
Ziolkowski has shown, Schiller’s definition of the elegy according to the sentiments it aroused 
rather than by its form or simple thematic content upheld the ideas of the aesthetic theorists 
who had recently preceded him, 112  who had routinely cited exile poetry as examples. 
Gottsched, whose Critische Dichtkunst (1730) defined the elegy first and foremost as lament 
                                                     
109 ‘Reflections on Exile’, p. 173.  
110 Theodore Ziolkowski, The Classical German Elegy, 1795-1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), p. 288; Unerhörte Klagen: Deutsche Elegien des 20. Jahrhunderts, 
ed. by Rüdiger Görner (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 2000), p. 225.  
111 Manfred Durzak, ‘Im Exil’, in Geschichte der deutschen Lyrik vom Mittelalter bis zur 
Gegenwart, ed. by Walter Hinderer (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1983), pp. 502-50 (p. 503). 
112 Ziolkowski, pp. 75-85.  
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(‘Sie soll […] einen traurigen Inhalt haben, und fast aus lauter Klagen bestehen’), had referred 
to Ovid’s Tristia as consisting ‘aus lauter Elegien, die er aus Scythien nach Rom, als 
Klageschreiben abgelassen’.113 Thomas Abbt’s essay on the elegy in 1762, which introduced 
the principle of mixed sensations into the genre – grief tempered by happy memories, for 
example – quoted Psalm 137 in a popular hymn adaptation, ‘An den Wasserflüssen Babylons’, 
as its first example of such a text.114 It was commonplace to refer to the elegiac couplet as the 
metre not only of Ovid’s love poetry (alongside that of Tibullus and Propertius) but also of the 
Tristia.115 
Schiller took the well-established example of the Tristia, however, and dismissed it. He 
defines the elegiac mode in Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung as redemptive, 
following the ‘mixed sensations’ model that originated with Abbt. Exile writing, too, may be 
redemptive, but the redemption to which Schiller’s definition of the elegy points is in timeless 
ideals, in ‘moral harmony’, not the restoration of worldly order once the loss has been made 
good: ‘Der elegische Dichter sucht die Natur […] als eine Idee und in einer Vollkommenheit, 
in der sie nie existirt hat, wenn er sie gleich als etwas da gewesenes und nun verlorenes 
                                                     
113 Johann Christoph Gottsched, Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst für die Deutschen […], 
2nd edn (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1737), p. 477.  
114 ‘B.’ [pseud., i.e. Thomas Abbt], ‘Klotzii opuscula poetica […]. Betrachtungen über die 
Natur der Elegie’, in Briefe, die Neueste Litteratur betreffend. XIII. Teil (Berlin: Nicolai, 1762), 
pp. 61-86 (p. 75).  
115 Johann Georg Sulzer, Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste. Zweyter Theil [E-Ion], 2nd 
edn (Leipzig: Weidmann, 1786), p. 41; Johann Joachim Eschenburg, Entwurf einer Theorie 
und Literatur der schönen Wissenschaften, 2nd edn (Berlin: Nicolai, 1789), p. 143.  
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beweint’ (NA 20, 450-51). Schiller also takes the Tristia as his first test case for the elegy, but 
he refuses to categorize them as elegiac, or, indeed, as poetry at all: ‘Es ist viel zu wenig 
Energie, viel zu wenig Geist und Adel in seinem Schmerz. Das Bedürfniß, nicht die 
Begeisterung stieß jene Klagen aus.’ Ovid ‘[vermißt schmerzlich] in seinem Exil zu Tomi die 
Glückseligkeit […], die Horaz in seinem Tibur so gern entbehrte’; his lament for Augustan 
Rome was understandable, but it was for finite greatness, an object ‘unworthy’ of poetry (NA 
20, 450 and 432). The notion that the elegy proceeds from the experience of loss to the 
invocation of an ideal models the development, and the positive potential, of ‘intellectual 
exile’, but it insists on downplaying that same experience in the process.  
Schiller’s own ‘Elegie’ modelled these ideas.116 There, the imagined walk of the poetic ‘I’ takes 
him past the stages through which nature develops into human civilization and is replaced by 
it: the ‘fall’ to modernity set out in the sixth of the Ästhetische Briefe, and from which the 
distinction between ‘naïve’ and ‘sentimental’ poetry stems. Not only is the wanderer himself 
an outside observer; the language of home and exile is a thread through the poem. The 
wanderer, first, by leaving for the mountain (l. 1) has escaped narrowness for openness, much 
like the ‘I’ of the Roman Elegies, and ‘den durstigen Blick labt das energische Licht’ (l. 10). 
Emerging from the forest he has crossed in lines 21-28, his observation of harmonious life, 
albeit at a distance (l. 31), carries no sense of estrangement, but watching primitive humanity 
develop into ordered society makes ‘home’ suddenly foreign: ‘Ein fremder | Geist verbreitet 
sich schnell über die fremdere Flur!’ (ll. 61-62). The forest fauns are ‘in die Wildniß […] 
                                                     
116 ‘Elegie’, as published in Die Horen, is quoted here from NA 1 (1943), 260-66. ‘Der 
Spaziergang’, the later, better-known version, is reproduced in NA 2.I (1983), 308-14. For a 
stimulating interpretation, see Alt, Schiller, vol. II, pp. 283-93. 
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verstoßen’ (l. 73). The next step after the formation of societal estates (l. 65) is the emergence 
of a nation (l. 81), which metaphorically houses the gods: ‘Von dem Himmel steigen die 
seligen Götter, und nehmen | In dem geweyhten Bezirk festliche Wohnungen ein’ (ll. 83-84). 
This marks still greater sophistication, but also the departure of the nation’s ‘heroes’ for 
foreign wars to defend the homeland (‘für die Penaten’, l. 94), specifically, to defend Greece 
against the Persians. The warriors die and are buried abroad. Schiller’s version of the epigram 
for the Spartan dead of Thermopylae, ascribed to Simonides, translates as ‘wanderer’ the 
xenos of the Greek original that variously also means ‘guest-friend’, ‘stranger’, ‘foreigner’, or 
‘refugee’: ‘Wanderer, kommst du nach Sparta, gieb Kunde dorten, du habest | Uns hier liegen 
gesehen, wie das Gesetz es befahl’ (ll. 101-02).117 Humanity breaks free of constraint by a 
reversal of all values, and there is a brief reminder of the wanderer’s perspective, watching 
the calamity from outside: ‘Leben wähnst du noch immer zu sehn, dich täuschen die Züge, | 
Hohl ist die Schaale, der Geist ist aus dem Leichnam geflohn’ (ll. 169-70). With the city reduced 
to ashes, the poem repeats its image of release into exile:  
O so öfnet euch Mauern, und gebt den Gefangenen ledig, 
                                                     
117 Greek Lyric 3, ed. by D. A. Campbell, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), pp. 540-41; Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edn with 
supplement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 1189, s.v. ξένος (Ep. and Ion. ξεῖνος), I-III. 
NA 2.II.A (1991), 291, identifies Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations 1.42.101 as Schiller’s source: 
‘Dic, hospes, Spartae nos te hic uidisse iacentis, | Dum sanctis patriae legibus obsequimur’. 
Cf. Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. by P. G. W. Glare (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 806, s.v. 
hospes 1 and 4: ‘guest’, ‘visitor’, ‘stranger’.  
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Zu der verlassenen Flur kehr er gerettet zurück!  
Weit von dem Menschen fliehe der Mensch! (ll. 183-85) 
The wanderer returns to a landscape that is void of all human activity. His observation of 
human development has been formative: from his flight from ‘des Zimmers Gefängnis’ he 
returns not to a primitive oneness with nature, but to heightened consciousness. His 
anthropological concern that civilization means corruption is resolved by understanding 
difference. Nature ‘[w]ieg[t] auf gleichem Mutterschoose die wechselnden Alter’ (l. 213) and 
the realization that ‘Homer’s sun’ also shines on ‘us’ (l. 216) comes not because we stand in 
the same sunrays as the Greeks, but because we enjoy the sunshine in the knowledge that 
Homer enjoyed it too. 118  On this reading of ‘Elegie’, art speaks to the present moment 
because – and as long as – it speaks to all time. 
VII. 
‘Elegie’ ends on a settled note, and Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung states its case 
in authoritative tones. Yet at the end of 1795, Schiller was still grappling with the problem he 
and Goethe had faced at the year’s beginning: how does art, and especially an aesthetic of 
harmony and completeness, deal with rupture, be that the political upheavals of the age or 
the intellectual and spiritual break between modernity and the ancient world? Über naive und 
sentimentalische Dichtung considers some of the art that might play a part in ‘aesthetic 
education’. Schiller’s vision of the elegy is of the type of poetry that might, momentarily, lift 
its reader’s eyes to the completeness that could be, whilst Goethe’s Roman Elegies celebrate 
                                                     
118 Alt, Schiller, vol. II, p. 293.  
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a fullness of life that is. Schiller rules out didactic writing as poetry (NA 20, 453-54), just as he 
had ruled out art as simple cultivation in the Ästhetische Briefe.  
Does this amount to ‘Exil[-] des Geistes’, in Kesten’s terms? There are fundamental 
differences. Schiller wanted the poet to be a Horace, renouncing Rome by choice and in 
comfort; his model did not extend to Ovid’s laments at the Black Sea. It does not extend to 
the exiles of the twentieth century, either, for whom the break with what is lost cannot be 
made good. Karl Wolfskehl’s six-poem ‘Mittelmeer’ cycle (published 1950) might be seen as 
analogous to Schiller’s ‘Elegie’ in the long history of humanity that it traces at a meeting-point 
of civilizations, the Mediterranean sea. In the last poem in the cycle, ‘Ultimus Vatum’ (‘The 
Last of the Prophets’), the ‘I’ is first exiled to Germany after the fall of the Temple in Jerusalem. 
More than a thousand years later he is bitterly exiled again: ‘Mich wies ein Wicht in Acht und 
Aberacht, | Griff mir ans Herz und trieb mich in die Nacht’.119 The end of the poem foresees 
the collapse of the German ‘Reich’, to be replaced by a spiritual empire instead: 
Denn wen Wandlung umschuf zu Kür und Sende, 
Gärt, Evios, ewig aus Allgottes Lende,  
Zu Neuem Reich gefeit an Neuer Wende.  
So taucht im Drang mystischer Wiederkehr 
                                                     
119 Karl Wolfskehl, Gesammelte Werke, ed. by Margot Ruben and Claus Victor Bock, 2 vols 
(Hamburg: Claassen, 1960), vol. I, p. 192. See further Norman Franke, ‘Jüdisch, römisch, 
deutsch zugleich...’? Eine Untersuchung der literarischen Selbstkonstruktion Karl Wolfskehls 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Exillyrik (Heidelberg: Winter, 2006), pp. 448-58.  
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Entbunden heim vom Rhein der letzte Seh’r,  
In letzter Sohnschaft heim in Unser Meer.120  
The prophet’s return home to the Mediterranean is arguably a positive end, but although 
visionary, it is not the same as the end of ‘Elegie’: this is restoration, not reconciliation. 
Homer’s sun, to paraphrase Schiller, has emphatically set on Germany here. As with Adorno, 
what Schiller insists must be redeemable seemed beyond all redemption by 1945.  
There are too many resonances between the ideas of these two ages, however, to dismiss a 
connection entirely. Schiller and Goethe’s references to exiles and emigrants in setting out 
the force of autonomous art recur too often to be ignored. Their programme for a German 
classical literature did not come about in intellectual comfort, however settled it might appear 
in retrospect; their aim, in Said’s phrase, was ‘constantly being unsettled, and unsettling 
others’, and the fact and imagery of exile were key ingredients of their emerging poetics in 
the 1790s. It is significant that their response to the traumas and the displacement of people 
in their times led them to confront the same problems to which later generations, facing 
devastation on a scale that was inconceivable in the 1790s, would nonetheless return. In turn, 
the German exiles of the 1930s and ’40s demonstrated similarities with the thinking of Die 
Horen that are surprising if we see only the exiles as unsettled and classicism as fixed. Exiles 
were sceptical about didactic poetry, as Schiller had been, and not only because they were 
cut off from their audience. The Dichter versus Schriftsteller debate about what constitutes 
‘true’ poetry, arguably set in motion by Schiller’s categories of the naïve and sentimental, and 
established with certainty in another exile text, Heinrich Heine’s Ludwig Börne. Eine 
                                                     
120 Wolfskehl, vol. I, p. 193.  
63 
 
   
 
Denkschrift (1840), continued to rage as the exiles from Nazism grappled with the problem of 
relevant and irrelevant writing. Kesten’s vocabulary – ‘das Mass, die Vollkommenheit, das 
Gleichgewicht’ – uses the very terms that defined the aesthetic of German classicism. Perhaps 
the accidental ambiguity in Heinrich Mann’s phrase when quoted in isolation 121  – a 
conditional verb that could be misread for the past tense – is in fact justified: Goethe indeed, 
then, ‘teilte mit uns allen das Exil’.  
  
                                                     
121 ‘…er teilte mit uns allen das Exil’: Goethebilder der deutschsprachigen Emigration 1933-
1945. Eine Ausstellung des Deutschen Exilarchivs 1933-1945 der Deutschen Bibliothek, ed. by 
Britta Eckert and Werner Berthold (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999).  
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